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Sharon N. Freytag,* Don D. Bush,** and James Paul George***
ONFLICTS of law occur when foreign elements appear in a lawsuit.
Nonresident litigants, incidents in sister states or foreign countries,
and lawsuits from other jurisdictions represent foreign elements that
may create problems in judicial jurisdiction, choice of law, or recognition of
foreign judgments, respectively. This Article reviews Texas conflicts of law
during the Survey period from late 1986 through 1987. The survey includes
cases from Texas state and federal courts and non-Texas cases affecting
Texas practice. Excluded are cases involving federal/state conflicts, criminal
law, intrastate matters such as subject matter jurisdiction and venue, except
when they relate to the personal jurisdiction inquiry, and conflicts in time,
such as the applicability of prior or subsequent law within a state. During
the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court decided an important case find-
ing jurisdiction based on contacts related to the cause of action. During the
same period, the United States Supreme Court decided a case, which,
although based on varying rationales, was the first unanimous decision find-
ing a lack of personal jurisdiction since International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton.1 Choice of law highlights include Texas's enactment of a new statute
governing contractual choice of law and Texas courts' improvement in their
application of the most significant relationship test from the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.2 Foreign judgments' significant development
was the declared unconstitutionality of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act.3
I. JUDICIAL JURISDICTION 4
To assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, a plaintiff must ensure
* B.A., University of Kansas; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., Southern Methodist
University. Attorney, Haynes and Boone, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., University of Indiana; J.D., LL.M., Southern Methodist University. Attorney,
Johnson, Bromberg and Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., Oklahoma State University; J.D., University of Tulsa; LL.M., Columbia Uni-
versity. Attorney, Johnson, Bromberg and Leeds, Dallas, Texas.
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND)]. The most significant relationship test involves applying general choice prin-
ciples enumerated in § 6 to subject area factors discussed in §§ 145-423.
3. See infra notes 336-52 and accompanying text.
4. Judicial jurisdiction is distinct from legislative jurisdiction in that the latter concerns
"whether the state, through its courts or otherwise, has power to act upon the matter in issue
by using the state's rules of law to regulate or control it" while the former concerns the power
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
that the defendant is amenable to the jurisdiction of the court and that juris-
diction has been properly invoked through valid service of process on the
defendant. Amenability necessitates two inquiries: (1) Is the defendant
amenable to service of process under the state long-arm statute? (2) Is the
assertion of jurisdiction in accordance with due process? 5 Amenability is
discussed in Part A, while service of process is discussed in Part B. During
the Survey period, most activity in the area of judicial jurisdiction occurred
in the federal courts. The Texas Supreme Court decided one noteworthy
case, Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.6
A. Amenability
1. Texas State Courts
In Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.7 the Texas Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction over a nonresident who had contracted with a Texas resident,
who was not the plaintiff, because the nonresident's contract related to the
plaintiff's contract. After Advanced Concrete of Texas, a Texas corpora-
tion, entered a contract with the owner of property in Austin for construc-
tion of a hotel, Herbert Watkins, president of Advanced Concrete, executed
a contract with Otis Elevator Company, a New Jersey Corporation. This
contract called for the manufacture, sale, delivery, and installation of four
elevators for the hotel. Advanced Concrete and Zac Smith & Co., of Flor-
ida, thereafter executed a joint venture agreement for construction of the
Austin hotel. Both parties shared the responsibility for and control of the
construction project. Nearly five months after execution of the first con-
tract, the property owner executed a new contract for the construction of the
hotel with Advanced Concrete and Smith, a joint venture, and Austin Hotel
Association, Ltd. Although the hotel was never constructed, Otis Elevator
manufactured four elevators pursuant to the contract with Advanced Con-
crete and delivered the elevators to the empty Texas site. Otis Elevator
eventually filed suit in Texas against Advanced Concrete and Zac Smith &
Co. for breach of contract.
Smith filed a special appearance asserting lack of in personam jurisdiction.
The trial court sustained the objection to jurisdiction, but the court of ap-
peals reversed and held that Smith failed to meet its burden of negating all
bases of personal jurisdiction.8 The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court
of appeals, holding that Zac Smith had sufficient contacts with Texas for the
assertion of jurisdiction.9
of a court to act "against the particular person (usually the defendant) against whom, or the
thing against which, the Court is asked to act." R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 3
at 4 (3d ed. 1977) (emphasis in original).
5. The two inquiries essentially collapse into one because the Texas Supreme Court has
interpreted the Texas long-arm statute to reach to the limits of due process. U-Anchor Adver-
tising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978).
6. 734 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1986).
7. Id.




The supreme court analyzed the case in terms of specific jurisdiction10 and
described a bifurcated fair warning requirement.1 I The court noted that the
two prongs of the fair warning requirement, purposeful direction and a
nexus between the action and the litigation, constitute the first two prongs of
the three-prong jurisdictional test outlined in O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.' 2 When
these two prongs are satisfied, the court indicated that the requirements for
specific personal jurisdiction established in Burger King 13 and Helicopteros 14
are met.' 5 The court then turned to the third prong of the O'Brien test,
observing that an evaluation of the quality, nature, and extent of the defend-
ant's contacts in a specific jurisdiction case must establish that the defend-
ant's contacts with the forum result from activities the defendant actually
conducts that cause a substantial connection with the jurisdiction in ques-
tion. 16 Thus, the activities of the defendant must be deliberate and signifi-
cant. This third prong augments the first insofar as the purposeful activity
must be significant activity and not simply some act. Once the third prong is
met, the Texas Supreme Court observed that the defendant bears the burden
of demonstrating that other considerations make the assertion of jurisdiction
10. The United States Supreme Court first used the term "specific jurisdiction" in
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), to refer to the exer-
cise of "jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's
contacts with the forum." Id. at 414 n.8. General jurisdiction exists when a state exercises
jurisdiction over a defendant and the suit does not arise out of or is not related to the defend-
ant's contracts with the forum. Id. at 414 n.9.
11. The court described the fair warning requirement as follows:
Where contacts with the foreign sovereign are not continuing and systematic,
but rather specific jurisdiction is alleged, the "fair warning" requirement is two-
fold. First, the defendant's activities must have been "purposefully directed" to
the forum, and second, the litigation must result from alleged injuries that "arise
out of or relate to those activities."
734 S.W.2d at 633 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
12. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966). O'Brien's three-pronged test requires that:
(1) the nonresident or foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or
consummate some transaction in the forum state; (2) the cause of action must
arise from or be connected with, such act or transaction; and (3) the assumption
of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and ex-
tent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the
benefits and protections of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective
parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
Id. at 342.
In Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1982),
rev'd on other grounds, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), the Texas Supreme Court noted that the second
prong of the three-part test, the nexus requirement, is not required in general jurisdiction
cases, but is required in specific jurisdiction cases:
The second prong is useful in any fact situation in which a jurisdiction question
exists; and is a necessary requirement where the nonresident defendant only
maintained single or few contacts with the forum. However, the second prong is
unnecessary when the nonresident defendant's presence in the forum through
numerous contacts is of such a nature ... so as to satisfy the demands of the
ultimate test of due process.
13. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
14. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
15. Zac Smith, 734 S.W.2d at 665-66.
16. Id. at 664.
19ss1
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unreasonable.' 7 The Zac Smith opinion suggests that once the court deter-
mines that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits and pro-
tections of the forum state's laws, the defendant must show "a compelling
case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdic-
tion unreasonable" 18 in order to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction.' 9
Although Texas courts have traditionally placed the burden on the defend-
ant to negate all bases of jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court first
shifted the burden to the defendant to demonstrate unfairness in Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz. 20 The Zac Smith opinion appears to embrace the
Burger King approach, suggesting that the burden of proof in Texas jurisdic-
tional issues is now more closely aligned with federal requirements.
In Zac Smith the court determined that the defendant had not met its
burden. 21 Although Smith had no physical ties to Texas, the court pointed
out that the parties formed the joint venture to build a hotel in Texas, and
the elevator contract related directly to the hotel enterprise. 22 The court
further noted that, even though the hotel project did not reach completion,
numerous intermediate activities did occur and the parties aimed subsequent
contract negotiations toward Texas residents.23 The parties availed them-
selves of the benefits and protections of the laws of Texas and expected to
profit from construction of the hotel. 24 The elevator contract constituted
only one step necessary to complete the project, which represented the real
goal of the business transaction. 25 The Texas Supreme Court concluded:
"The due process clause may not be wielded as a territorial seal to avoid
interstate obligations that have been assumed voluntarily. '26
The Zac Smith court considered the entire business transaction in its juris-
dictional analysis, including both the contract between plaintiff Otis Elevator
and defendant Advanced Concrete for the manufacture and sale of the eleva-
tors and the joint venture agreement between defendant Zac Smith and de-
fendant Advanced Concrete for the construction of the hotel.27 The elevator
contract at issue was not between the plaintiff and the defendant corporation
contesting jurisdiction.
Three justices dissented: Justices Robertson, Ray and Wallace. The dis-
sent noted that Smith's only contact with Texas was the proposed joint ven-
ture agreement with Advanced Concrete, which was not even the center of
the litigation. Smith did not ratify the elevator contract and did not become
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487).
19. Zac Smith, 734 S.W.2d at 664. The court does not specifically state but rather implies
a shifting of burdens.
20. 471 U.S. 462, 486 (1985).
21. 734 S.W.2d at 666.
22. Both the purpose of the joint venture and the contract with the property owner were
wholly performable in Texas. Id. at 665.
23. Id. at 665-66.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 666.
26. Id. (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474).
27. 734 S.W.2d at 665-66.
[Vol. 42
CONFLICT OF LAWS
associated with Advanced Concrete until after the elevator contract was exe-
cuted. Nevertheless, the majority of the Texas Supreme Court held that spe-
cific jurisdiction may attach when a nonresident executes a contract with a
Texas resident, other than the plaintiff, which relates to the contract forming
the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action.28
Teton International v. First National Bank 29 represents a clear case of spe-
cific jurisdiction because the defendants' contact with the state formed the
very basis of the tort alleged. Teton International and B & B Corporation
manufactured mobile homes from their offices in Mills, Wyoming. They
sold three mobile homes to K & G RV Sales in Mission, Texas. K & G paid
with personal checks, which the bank returned unpaid due to insufficient
funds. Teton and B & B never received payment for the mobile homes. The
First National Bank of Mission had loaned K & G $51,690.00, ostensibly to
pay for the mobile homes, and had deposited that sum in K & G's account.
The bank took a security interest in the mobile homes. When K & G de-
faulted on the note, Teton and B & B repossessed the mobile homes in Texas
and resold them in Arizona. The First National Bank of Mission then
brought suit against Teton International and B & B, alleging conversion of
collateral. The bank won on summary judgment.
. On appeal, the court rejected Teton's and B & B's claims that the trial
court erred in asserting personal jurisdiction over them.30 The court deter-
mined that the defendant's actions came within the provisions of the Texas
long-arm statute.31 The court cited several facts in support of this conclu-
sion. Because Teton & B & B agreed to sell mobile homes to K & G, to
deliver the homes to Mission, Texas, and to receive payment upon delivery,
and because the repossession arose out of the transaction with K & G and
the cause of action stemmed from the repossession, the lower court correctly
asserted personal jurisdiction over Teton and B & B.3 2
2. United States Supreme Court and Federal Courts in Texas33
The proper application of the stream of commerce theory divided the
Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.34 Plaintiff Gary
28. Id. at 666. The Supreme Court in Helicopteros did not decide the "relatedness" issue.
466 U.S. at 418 n.12.
29. 718 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
30. Id. at 841.
31. Id. at 840.
32. Id.
33. Federal courts deal with two categories of personal jurisdiction: (1) state long arm for
federal diversity cases and state court opinions reviewed by the Supreme Court, and
(2) amenability for federal question cases. The former is governed by the fourteenth
amendment, the latter by the fifth. This Survey period produced no significant federal question
amenability cases.
34. 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987). The court phrased the issue before it as
follows:
Whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the compo-
nents it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside of the United States would
reach the forum state in the stream of commerce constitutes minimum contacts
between the defendant and the forum state, such that the exercise of jurisdiction
"does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"
1988]
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Zurcher sustained injuries in a motorcycle accident in Solano County, Cali-
fornia in 1978. His wife died in the accident. Zurcher filed a product liabil-
ity action in the Superior Court of the State of California against Cheng Shin
Rubber Industrial Co. and the Taiwanese manufacturer of the motorcycle,
among others. Cheng Shin filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification
from the co-defendants and from Asahi Metal Industry Co., the Japanese
manufacturer of a tube's valve assembly. Cheng Shin and the other defend-
ants settled with Zurcher, leaving only Cheng Shin's indemnity action
against Asahi. Asahi manufactured tire valve assemblies in Japan, sold the
assemblies to Cheng Shin in Taiwan, and shipped them from Japan to Tai-
wan for use as components in finished tire tubes. Cheng Shin bought and
incorporated into its tire tubes over 100,000 Asahi valve assemblies each
year from 1978 to 1982.
Asahi moved to quash Cheng Shin's service of summons, arguing that the
California court lacked personal jurisdiction. As evidence of Asahi's con-
tacts with California, Cheng Shin's attorney emphasized his informal exami-
nation of the valve stems of tire tubes sold in one bicycle shop in Solano
County, California, the site of the accident. The survey revealed that out of
the approximately 150,000 tire tubes in this store, twelve had Asahi valve
stems incorporated into Cheng Shin tire tubes and nine more Asahi valve
stems were incorporated into other tire tubes. Further, Cheng Shin filed the
affidavit of a manager whose duties involved purchasing component parts.
The affidavit stated that the manager had discussed Cheng Shin's sales of
tubes to the United States with Asahi representatives who were aware that
the valve assemblies ended up in the United States and California. Conclud-
ing that Asahi did business on an international scale, the superior court de-
nied the motion to quash summons.
The California court of appeals issued a peremptory writ of mandate com-
manding the superior court to quash service of summons, concluding it
would be unreasonable to require Asahi to defend the indemnity suit in Cali-
fornia. The California Supreme Court reversed and discharged the writ.
The California Supreme Court concluded that although Asahi had no of-
fices, property, or agents in California, solicited no business, in California,
and made no direct sales in California, Asahi knew that some of the valve
assemblies sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated in tire tubes sold in
California. The court, thus, considered Asahi's intentional act of placing its
components into the stream of commerce by delivering the components to
Cheng Shin in Taiwan, coupled with Asahi's awareness that some of the
components eventually found their way to California, sufficient to support
state court jurisdiction.
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 35 A majority of the Court, all
Justices but Justice Scalia, concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction would
107 S. Ct. at 1029, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 100 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945)) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
35. 107 S. Ct. at 1035, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107.
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be unreasonable and unfair.36 Three Justices, Justice Stevens joined by Jus-
tices White and Blackmun, did not believe an examination of the minimum
contacts issue was even necessary. 37 Four Justices, Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall and Blackmun, believed minimum contacts existed. 38 Four Jus-
tices, Justice O'Connor, the Chief Justice, Justices Powell and Scalia, dis-
agreed. Though the nine Justices had differing bases, they unanimously
agreed that the state lacked personal jurisdiction. 39
Focusing on the constitutional touchstone first announced in Hanson v.
Denkla,4° that to establish minimum contacts the defendant must purpose-
fully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, 41 Jus-
tice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and
Scalia, determined that the mere act of placing the valve assemblies in the
stream of commerce did not constitute purposeful availment. 42 The plural-
ity noted the two lines of decisions that had developed after World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 43 suggested the stream of commerce theory
and rejected those decisions, such as Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech-
nology Corp.," which concluded that mere awareness that the product could
be sold in the forum was sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction.
These Justices concluded that the substantial connection between the de-
fendant and the forum required by Burger King 45 and McGee46 to support a
finding of minimum contacts must result from activities the defendant delib-
erately directed towards the forum state.47 The plurality observed that
merely placing a product in the stream of commerce does not constitute an
act of the defendant deliberately aimed at the forum state.48 The plurality
cited additional conduct by the defendant that may indicate an intent to
purposefully direct its actions toward the forum state, such as advertising in
the forum state, designing the product for market in the forum state, estab-
lishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum
state, or marketing the product through a distributor who serves as a sales
agent in the forum state.49 The plurality did not find these factors present in
36. Id. Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the Court's
opinion regarding the unfairness of the assertion ofjurisdiction. Id. Justice Scalia did not join
the Court's opinion on the fairness of the assertion of jurisdiction, but he did join the plural-
ity's opinion, delivered by Justice O'Connor, in deciding that minimum contacts were lacking.
Id.
37. Id. at 1038, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 109.
38. Id. at 1037-38, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 109.
39. Asahi is the first unanimous Supreme Court decision finding no personal jurisdiction
since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
40. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
41. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1032, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 104.
42. Id. at 1035, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107.
43. 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
44. 744 F.2d 1081, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1984).
45. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
46. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).






A majority of the Court51 joined in determining that the exercise of juris-
diction over Asahi was unreasonable. The majority concluded that the bur-
den an assertion of jurisdiction placed on the defendant Asahi was severe.52
The Court further held that the foreign plaintiff's interest and California's
interest in asserting jurisdiction over Asahi was slight because the case only
involved an indemnification dispute based on a Taiwanese transaction be-
tween Cheng Shin, a Taiwanese corporation, and Asahi, a Japanese
corporation. 53
Four Justices, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, who
joined the majority in concluding that the assertion of jurisdiction was un-
reasonable and unfair, disagreed with the plurality's interpretation of the
stream of commerce theory. These Justices did not see a need for additional
conduct beyond a defendant's placing a product into the stream of com-
merce before jurisdiction may attach. 54 In their opinion, Asahi represented
the rare case in which even though the defendant deliberately engaged in
forum activities, the minimum contacts requirements within the idea of fair
play and substantial justice undermined the reasonableness of jurisdiction. 55
According to these four Justices, a defendant who places goods in the stream
of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale in the forum state,
and as long as he is aware of marketing in the forum, he cannot be surprised
when a lawsuit results. 56 These Justices believed Asahi had sufficient mini-
mum contacts with California. 57 They believed that the plurality retreated
from the Court's analysis in World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 58 in which
the Court made the distinction between goods reaching the forum state
through a chain of distribution and goods reaching the state because the
consumer took them there.59
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmun, concurred in part
and concurred in the judgment. These Justices did not join in the plurality's
stream of commerce theory because they believed it was unnecessary for the
decision.6° These three Justices stated that the minimum contacts analysis
was not always necessary to determine whether a state court acted constitu-
tionally in asserting personal jurisdiction.61 The majority found that the ex-
50. Id.
51. This majority included Justice O'Connor, who authored the opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
52. 107 S. Ct. at 1034, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 105. The Court stated, "The unique burdens
placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over
national borders." Id.
53. Id. 94 L. Ed. 2d at 106.
54. Id. at 1035, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 107.
55. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985)).
56. Id. at 1038, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 110.
57. Id.
58. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). Justice White authored the opinion in World- Wide Volkswagen.
59. Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1037, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 108.




ercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable and unfair and that finding
alone required reversal. Nonetheless, even assuming the purposeful direc-
tion test used by the plurality applied, these Justices believed that the plural-
ity misapplied the test.62 They asserted that a regular course of dealing,
which resulted in the delivery of over 100,000 units by Asahi to Cheng Shin
annually, constituted purposeful availment.63
A deciding factor here, of course, was the nature of the claim and the
claimant in the California court, an indemnification claim by a Taiwanese
corporation. Had the injured motorcycle driver attempted to assert jurisdic-
tion over Asahi, the result would have probably differed because of Califor-
nia's increased interest in the issue. Even on these facts, five Justices,
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, would appar-
ently find sufficient minimum contacts through an indirect stream of
commerce.
Regrettably, in Asahi, the Supreme Court merely muddied the stream,
leaving the question before it to be resolved by the lower courts: Is mere
awareness by a foreign defendant that its goods will reach a state, without
direct activity in the forum by that defendant, sufficient for the assertion of
jurisdiction? Asahi does demonstrate, however, that the minimum contacts
and reasonableness inquiries are separate, and that at least three Justices
would not even consider the minimum contacts question in some cases.
The Fifth Circuit in Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.64 recognized that the
stream of commerce theory had divided the Supreme Court and observed
that the Asahi opinion involved specific, not general, jurisdiction and thus
did not affect the outcome in Bearry. Bearry raised the issue of whether a
federal court in Texas had jurisdiction over Beech Aircraft for claims unre-
lated to the forum solely because a large quantity of products manufactured
by Beech had flowed through the stream of commerce into Texas over the
preceding five-year period. The Bearry court emphasized that Asahi in-
volved an indemnification dispute arising from the defendant's contacts, and,
regardless of the Supreme Court's position on the proper application of the
stream of commerce theory, the Asahi decision did not affect the distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction.65 A continuous stream of com-
merce into a state may be sufficient for the assertion of specific jurisdiction
when the cause of action arises from that commerce but be insufficient for
the assertion of general jurisdiction based on unrelated claims. 66
Lonnie Bearry and Alva Mills, both Louisiana residents, purchased a
Beech aircraft in Louisiana. The aircraft crashed in Mississippi. After the
product liability suit filed in Louisiana was dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the survivors of Bearry and Mills filed separate suits in Texas
state court. The suits were removed to federal court and consolidated. The
62. Id., 94 L. Ed. 2d at 111.
63. Id. Asahi's deliveries, however, arrived in the states indirectly through Cheng Shin's
marketing.





plaintiff alleged jurisdiction over Beech through the Texas long-arm
statute. 6
7
Beech, a Delaware corporation, maintains its principal place of business in
Kansas. Its design, testing, manufacturing, sales, and warehouse facilities
are located in Kansas, Colorado, and Alabama. Beech has never qualified to
do business nor maintained an agent for service of process in Texas. It has
no telephone listing in Texas; it has no warehouse or manufacturing facility
and no bank account in Texas; it has no employees or directors who are
permanently assigned to work in Texas; nor has it insured any person in
Texas, bought real estate in Texas, or paid taxes in Texas.
Beech did engage in a nationwide marketing campaign from 1980 to 1985.
During this period, nearly $250,000,000 of Beech products flowed to seven-
teen independent Texas dealers from sales negotiated and completed in Kan-
sas.68 Beech also manufactured airframe assemblies for Bell Helicopter in
Fort Worth, Texas, and Beech representatives visited Texas dealers occa-
sionally to assist them with maintenance problems, demonstrate new air-
craft, and offer sales incentives, at the dealers' request. Beech also purchased
$195,000,000 of goods and services from over 500 Texas vendors under con-
tracts negotiated in Kansas.
The parties agreed that the lawsuit did not relate in any way to Beech's
contacts with Texas. Nonetheless, the district court determined that,
although specific jurisdiction did not exist, enough continuous and system-
atic contacts through Beech's creation of a stream of commerce with Texas
existed for the assertion of general jurisdiction.69 The Fifth Circuit dis-
agreed. Before explaining its rationale, the court carefully reviewed the two
distinct yet overlapping interests, the two limits on state power, that a court
must consider in making its jurisdictional inquiry.70 The court first empha-
sized the federalism concerns of state sovereignty. 71 The court observed that
although the Supreme Court suggested in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Com-
pagnie des Bauxites de Guinea,72 that the interstate federalism inquiry is not
a separate jurisdictional inquiry, the Supreme Court retreated from that po-
sition in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,73 in which the Court
required consideration of "the shared interest of the several states in further-
ing fundamental substantive social policies."'74 Second Bearry emphasized
the personal right to due process secured by the fourteenth amendment. The
Supreme Court in Insurance Corp. of Ireland indicated that the individual
67. The court noted that the statutory and constitutional inquiries collapsed into one be-
cause the Texas long-arm reaches as far as constitutionally allowed. Id. at 372. See infra text
accompanying notes 112-30, for discussion of the Louisiana nexus requirement and breadth of
the Louisiana long-arm statute.
68. One of the dealers was a subsidiary of Beech, but its contacts could not properly be
attributed to Beech because the dealer operated as a distinct corporation. 818 F.2d at 372-73.
69. Id. at 373.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 456 U.S. 694, 701-02 (1985).
73. 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1034, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 105 (1987).
74. Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375.
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liberty interest was the only appropriate due process inquiry.75 The Bearry
opinion states that the origins of the federalism interests and liberty interests
differ, but each limits state power. 76 The court noted that federalism limits
states through their membership in the union, and state residents enforce
these limits. 77 Liberty is an affirmative right running directly from the due
process clause to the populace. 78 Although many readers focus only on the
stream of commerce discussion in Asahi, the Bearry court interpreted Asahi
to reaffirm the federalism element in the judicial jurisdictional inquiry.79
The Fifth Circuit explained the distinction between specific and general
jurisdiction, noting that if the contacts with the forum resulted from the
defendant's conduct and created a substantial connection with the forum
state, even a single act could support jurisdiction. 80 The court further ob-
served that when a foreign defendant's contact stems from the product the
defendant sold or manufactured and the product causes harm in the forum
state, the court has jurisdiction if it finds that the defendant placed the prod-
uct into the stream of commerce with the realization that consumers in the
forum state would purchase or use the product.8' Due process requires in-
75. 456 U.S. at 702. The Supreme Court observed that personal jurisdiction represents a
restriction on judicial power as a matter of individual liberty, and not as a matter of sover-
eignty. The Court remarked:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as
applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of
state sovereignty vis-i-vis other states. . . . The restriction on state sovereign
power . . . . however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That clause is the only
source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no
mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept oper-
ated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual ac-
tions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can sub-
ject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected.
Id. at 702 n.10 (citations omitted).
76. Bearry, 818 F.2d at 373.
77. Id. at 374.
78. Id. The Bearry decision suggests that the federalism element is not rooted in the due
process clause. Professors Abrams and Dimond have proposed that federalism issues are more
appropriately analyzed under the full faith and credit clause than under the due process clause,
and that, in fact, due process analysis is an inappropriate means of addressing federalism con-
cerns. See Abrams & Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Control of State
Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 87 (1984). According to these commentators, the
ultimate responsibility for resolving federalism concerns in the exercise of judicial jurisdiction
should be Congress's, not the courts'. See id. In contrast, Professor Stein believes that the
sovereignty inquiry is critical to due process analysis. See Stein, Styles of Argument and Inter-
state Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 761 (1987).
79. Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375.
80. Id. at 374 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985); McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
81. Bearry, 818 F.2d at 374 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286, 298 (1980)). If the cause of action in Bearry had arisen from or been related to the
defendant's stream of commerce, the court would have had to confront directly the Supreme
Court's division on the stream of commerce issue. Bearry presented a simpler case of general
jurisdiction, but the court, in dicta, suggested that had the cause of action arisen from any of
Beech's contacts with Texas, it would have found specific jurisdiction. 818 F.2d at 376. The
facts in Bearry, of course, differ from those in Asahi insofar as Beech delivered products di-
rectly to Texas. Cf. Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. 1985);
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creased contacts when the cause of action does not relate to or arise from the
foreign defendant's deliberate actions within the forum state. In these situa-
tions, litigants must show continuous and systematic contact between the
state and the foreign corporation to support an exercise of general personal
jurisdiction. The increased contact is required because the state lacks a di-
rect interest in the cause of action. 82 The Fifth Circuit explained that in a
specific jurisdiction case the fact that the defendant placed the instrumental-
ity that harmed the plaintiff into the stream of commerce proves only that
the plaintiff's injury resulted from the defendant's conduct and not from the
plaintiff's unilateral activities.8 3 The defendant's injection of a product into
the stream of commerce does not ensure that the defendant's relationship
with the forum is continuous and systematic enough to permit suit on unre-
lated claims. 84
The Bearry court determined that even if Beech's contacts could be char-
acterized as continuous and systematic, in this case the assertion of jurisdic-
tion would be unfair and unreasonable.8 5 The court assessed the factors
outlined in Asahi: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the interest of the
forum state; (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, and (4) the interest
of the several states.86 The court emphasized that the cause of action impli-
cated no interest in Texas.87 The court observed that the interests of Missis-
sippi, the locus of both the injury, and Kansas, the residence of the
defendant, were greater than those of Texas.88 The court confirmed, how-
ever, that the burden on the defendant would not be sufficient to overcome
an assertion of specific jurisdiction.8 9 The court determined that the interest
of Texas in the quality and safety of the products introduced into the state is
protected because Beech is subject to the specific jurisdiction of Texas courts
when Beech products cause injuries or when Beech breaches a contract in
Texas.90
The opinion in Ramm v. Rowland 91 demonstrates that even limited tele-
phone calls to the state may provide sufficient minimum contacts for a con-
(court found minimum contacts even though foreign corporation delivered products indirectly
into forum through independent distributor); Strick Corp. v. Keen, 709 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, rev'd on other grounds, 31 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 209, 211) (Feb.
13, 1987) (minimum contacts found where foreign defendant manufactured defective compo-
nent part but had no knowledge of where part would go once assembled on trailer).
82. 818 F.2d at 374. Thus, the liberty interest and the federalism interest overlap.
83. Id. at 376.
84. Id. The stream of commerce may provide some evidence of purposeful availment, but
the United States Supreme Court has left open the question of whether it creates a minimum
contact when the defendant does not direct the stream of commerce to the forum. See Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 104 (1987). See supra
notes 34-63 and accompanying text.
85. Bearry, 818 F.2d at 377.
86. Id. at 376-77 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92, 105
(1987)).
87. Bearry, 818 F.2d at 373.
88. Id. at 377.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 658 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
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stitutional exercise of specific jurisdiction. In Ramm the plaintiff filed an
alienation of affection complaint in federal district court. The plaintiff com-
pleted service of process pursuant to the Texas long-arm statute,92 which
provides for service of process on a defendant who commits a tort in whole
or in part in the state. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The defendant's only contacts with the forum were
telephone calls and letters directed to the plaintiff's wife in Texas. During
March and October of 1984, the defendant contacted the plaintiff's wife in
Texas to request that she meet him in California and New Jersey, respec-
tively. The wife joined the defendant in New Jersey and did not return to
Texas.
The court determined that the assertion of specific jurisdiction was appro-
priate. Clearly, the defendant's contacts with the forum were not systematic
and continuous enough to support general jurisdiction, but the court noted
that the Texas long-arm statute included within its reach defendants who
commit a single tort in the State of Texas.93 Citing Brown v. Flowers Indus-
try, Inc.,94 the court noted that a single long distance telephone call that
allegedly constituted a tort committed in whole or in part in the forum state
may establish in personam jurisdiction." Here, the defendant's alleged
phone call to the plaintiff's wife to encourage her to leave her husband repre-
sents the very essence of the tort, the consequences of which harmed the
plaintiff in Texas.96 The court noted that the Burger King 97 Court empha-
sized that as long as the defendant purposefully directs his actions toward an
out-of-state resident, absence of actual physical contact with that state
would not defeat personal jurisdiction.98
Both Caldwell v. Palmetto State Savings Bank 99 and Hayes v. Gulf Oil
Corp. °0 emphasize the difference between subject matter and personal juris-
diction, a difference that the parties in these cases attempted unsuccessfully
to blur. In Caldwell the Texas plaintiffs brought suit based upon an asset
purchase agreement and the corresponding financing. The plaintiffs exe-
cuted the asset purchase agreement with a South Carolina general partner-
ship, the Georgetown Insurance Company, and arranged the financing
through the Palmetto State Savings Bank of South Carolina. The district
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion. The plaintiff's complaint only asserted that the district court had di-
versity jurisdiction as well as federal question jurisdiction based on the
RICO statute. 01 The plaintiffs apparently made no mention of the Texas
92. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.042 (Vernon 1986).
93. 658 F. Supp. at 708.
94. 688 F.2d 328, 332-33 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983).
95. 658 F. Supp. at 708.
96. Id.
97. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
98. 658 F. Supp. at 708.
99. 811 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1987).
100. 821 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987).
101. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a)-(d) (1982) (venue & process section of RICO statute).
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long-arm statute, asserted no facts connecting the defendants with Texas,
and made no attempts to refute the facts stated in the defendants' affidavits.
On appeal, the plaintiffs continued to assert that diversity gave the court a
sufficient basis for jurisdiction and in the reply brief asserted, for the first
time, that the defendants had some contact with Texas based upon a letter
mailed to the plaintiffs in Texas that described the proposed terms of the
loan. As a matter of law, the court determined that a single letter sent by the
defendant to the plaintiffs in Texas was insufficient for the assertion of per-
sonal jurisdiction. 0 2 The court noted that the undisputed facts in the case
established that the defendants did not conduct business in Texas and there-
fore the RICO statute did not provide a basis for in personam jurisdiction. 0 3
With regard to the single letter, the court emphasized that the undisputed
facts showed that the plaintiff solicited the transaction and that a court does
not acquire jurisdiction over a defendant as a result of unilateral activities by
another person. 10 4 Noting the plaintiff's apparent ignorance of the differ-
ence between in personam jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction and of
the fact that both types of jurisdiction are required, the court imposed sanc-
tions for a frivolous appeal. 0 5
In Hayes the court discussed the settled principle of subject matter juris-
diction that a local action involving real property can only be brought within
the territorial boundaries of the state where the land is located. 10 6 The
plaintiff had filed suit in the Eastern District of Texas disputing title to real
property located in Colorado. The plaintiff argued that Shaffer v. Heitner 10 7
had rendered the local action rule invalid. The plaintiff suggested that the
local action doctrine conflicted with the underlying rationale of Shaffer,
which indicated that sovereignty and the territoriality of the states no longer
controlled the state court's exercise of jurisdiction. 08 The plaintiff appar-
ently concluded that, as long as a court has jurisdiction over the persons, it
has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute between those persons even if it
involves property located in another state. The Supreme Court in Shaffer
extended the minimum contacts analysis to all assertions of state court juris-
diction, including actions premising jurisdiction solely on the presence of a
party's property within the state. 1 9 The plaintiff argued that after Shaffer,
the presence of the property in Colorado was not relevant because the de-
fendant, Gulf, had minimum contacts with Texas. Despite the defendant's
minimum contacts, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting that
102. 811 F.2d at 917 n.l. The court stated that it could consider that argument even
though it was raised for the first time on appeal because it could be decided as a matter of law
based on undisputed facts. Id
103. Id. at 917.
104. Id. at 919.
105. Id.
106. Hayes v. Gulf Oil Corp., 821 F.2d 285, 287 (5th Cir. 1987). Although Hayes did not
involve a dispute over personal jurisdiction, it is included here because of the court's rebuff of
the plaintiff's creative application of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
107. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
108. Hayes, 821 F.2d at 290.
109. 433 U.S. at 195.
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Shaffer spoke to personal, not subject matter, jurisdiction, and that subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction are separate concepts.110 The
court refused to find subject matter jurisdiction because the local action doc-
trine was viable and required that the property in dispute lie within the fo-
rum state. 11
3. Louisiana Long-Arm
This Article includes a discussion of the personal jurisdiction law of the
state of Louisiana because of its evolving nature and because Texas lawyers
who appear in Louisiana courts must be aware of this change. In 1985, the
Fifth Circuit interpreted the Louisiana long-arm statute to require a nexus
between the cause of action and the defendant's contacts with the forum. 11 2
The following case, decided during the Survey period, addressed this nexus
requirement.
In Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp."1 3 the Fifth Circuit certified
the nexus question to the Louisiana Supreme Court to determine the breadth
of the Louisiana long-arm statute.114 Before considering and certifying the
statutory issue, however, the court decided the constitutional issue. 115 It
considered the statutory issue only after the constitutional issue because of
the uncertainty of the law related to the breadth of the long-arm statute.
Petroleum Helicopters, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of
business in Louisiana, purchased a helicopter from Aerospatiale, a Texas
manufacturer. When the helicopter sank in the coastal waters off the Louisi-
ana shores, Petroleum Helicopters sued Aerospatiale and, among others,
Garrett, the designer, manufacturer, and assembler of the flotation devices.
The plaintiff served Garrett pursuant to the Louisiana long-arm statute.
Garrett, a California corporation, manufactured flotation devices in New
Jersey. Garrett had no employees nor any property or offices in Louisiana.
In 1980, Aerospatiale's sales to Petroleum Helicopters constituted
nineteen percent of its volume and in 1981, these sales constituted eight per-
cent of its volume. In 1981, Garrett sold replacement floats costing about
$7,000 to Petroleum Helicopters and another $14,000 worth of floats to
other Louisiana customers. Garrett made the replacement floats sold di-
rectly to Petroleum Helicopters for a different kind of helicopter from the
one that sank. Aside from the sale of helicopter floats, Garrett conducted a
substantial amount of business in Louisiana. In fact, between 1980 and
1983, its sales in Louisiana averaged $1.75 million.
In its jurisdictional inquiry the court emphasized that Garrett directly
served the Louisiana market with its replacement floats, even though the
floats sold to Petroleum Helicopters were for a different type of helicop-
110. 821 F.2d at 289.
111. Id.
112. See Farnham v. Bristow Helicopters, Inc., 776 F.2d 535, 537-38 (5th Cir. 1985).
113. 804 F.2d 1367 (5th Cir. 1986), rehearing den., 808 F.2d 1520 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
114. 804 F.2d at 372-73; see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(1) (West Supp. 1986).
115. 804 F.2d at 1371.
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ter.116 Moreover, Garrett sent representatives to Louisiana for promotion,
training, and servicing. As a result, Garrett purposefully availed itself of the
benefits of doing business in Louisiana and delivered the floats into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that Louisianians would purchase
them. The court determined that although Garrett's activities in Louisiana
did not rise to the level necessary to establish general jurisdiction, they were
sufficient to confer specific jurisdiction over Garrett. 17
Furthermore, the court stated that Louisiana had a strong interest in adju-
dicating the dispute." 8 A Louisiana firm used the helicopter and subse-
quently suffered the economic injury when the helicopter sank. The court
emphasized that the stream of commerce analysis does not turn upon
whether the accident occurred inside or outside of the forum."19 The loca-
tion did not affect the fairness to Garrett of appearing in Louisiana, whereas
it might have affected the state's interest in adjudicating the dispute. 120
Since the accident did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of any
other state, however, the injury did not occur in any particular state.
The court in Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. held that due process allowed the
assertion of specific jurisdiction over the defendant.' 2' The court then ad-
dressed the statutory question. Noting that although previous courts had
held that the Louisiana long-arm extended to the limits of due process, two
recent intermediate appellate court opinions interpreted the long-arm statute
more narrowly, requiring a direct nexus between the nonresident defendant's
business transacted in Louisiana and the plaintiff's cause of action.122
Following these state court decisions, the panel in Farnham v. Bristow
Helicopters, Inc.' 23 adopted the restrictive interpretation, requiring a direct
nexus between the cause of action and the defendant's activities in the fo-
rum. If such a direct nexus were required, the court in Petroleum Helicop-
ters would lack jurisdiction. Noting the apparent conflict between these
decisions and previous decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Fifth
Circuit in Petroleum Helicopters certified the question of the breadth of the
Louisiana long-arm statute to the Louisiana Supreme Court.' 24 The dissent
noted that certification was unnecessary as no post-Farnham Louisiana deci-
sions justified departure from its holding.' 25
116. Id. at 1370.
117. Id.




122. Id. at 1372; see Alba v. Riviere, 457 So. 2d 33, 34 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 462
So. 2d 194 (La. 1984); Robinson v. VanGuard Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 1360, 1369 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 924 (La. 1985).
123. 776 F.2d 535, 537 (5th Cir. 1985).
124. Certification was completed in Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco, 804 F.2d 1367
(5th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court of Louisiana at 503 So. 2d 1010 (La. 1987) consolidated
the case for argument with Superior Supply v. Associated Pipe & Supply, 499 So. 2d 558 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1986), which followed Farnham.
125. 776 F.2d at 373 (Garwood, J., dissenting). Since Petroleum, some courts have circum-
vented the statutory inquiry. See e.g., Bayou Steel Corp. v. M/V Amstelvoorn, 809 F.2d 1147,
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On October 20, 1987, the Louisiana Supreme Court determined the issue
certified to it.126 The court decided that, although the literal language of the
long-arm statute in effect when Petroleum Helicopters filed suit suggested a
nexus requirement, the September 1987 amendment to the statute extended
the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts to the limits of due process.' 27 As a
result, the Fifth Circuit's determination that the exercise of jurisdiction over
Garrett comported with due process meant that jurisdiction existed under
the Louisiana long-arm statute.' 28 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the 1987 amendment applied to all actions pending on the amendment's ef-
fective date.129 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the
case. 1
30
B. Service of Process
The constitutional notice requirement of service of process is an essential
element of judicial jurisdiction apart from the defendant's territorial contacts
with the forum state. Service of process must satisfy both forum law and
federal constitutional standards before a court can establish jurisdiction.
The exercise of jurisdiction requires: (1) the defendants' amenability to ser-
vice based on contacts with the forum state, and (2) the valid execution of
service. Failure of the first element requires dismissal, but failure of the sec-
ond does not require dismissal, at least not in Texas state courts.
In Bonewitz v. Bonewitz, 131 a breach of contract action, the plaintiff served
process on the Texas secretary of state,' 32 who forwarded the citation to the
defendant five days later. The defendant received the citation six days after
it was forwarded. After the court entered a default judgment, the defendant
appealed.' 33 The defendant initially argued that service was improper be-
cause the plaintiff served an employee of the secretary of state and not the
1150 (5th Cir. 1987) (to avoid issue of whether long-arm statute reached defendant, court
acknowledged statutory question certified to Louisiana Supreme Court remained unanswered
and decided case on constitutional grounds); GAMXX Energy, Inc. v. Frost, 668 F. Supp.
541, 545 (M.D. La. 1987) (court avoided long-arm inquiry by determining defendant lacked
requisite contacts with Louisiana to comply with due process requirements); cf. Singletary v.
B.R.X., Inc., 828 F.2d 1135, 1138 (5th Cir. 1987) (court dismissed case for lack of sufficient
contacts without addressing statutory concerns). The court in GAMXX noted that the Louisi-
ana legislature proposed an amendment to the Louisiana long-arm that would extend its reach
to the limits of due process and no longer require a nexus between the contacts and the cause
of action in all cases. 668 F. Supp. at 543.
126. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Aveo Corp., 513 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (La. 1987).
127. Id. at 1191, interpreting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 13:3202 (West 1982), repealed by 1987
La. Acts 418 (as amended at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 13:3201(B) (West Supp. 1987)).
128. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 834 F.2d 510, 511 (5th Cir. 1987).
129. Petroleum Helicopters, 513 So. 2d at 1191.
130. Petroleum Helicopters, 834 F.2d at 511.
131. 726 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.044 (Vernon 1986) (allows service of process
on secretary of state as authorized agent of defendant in certain situations).
133. In the trial court, after the judge signed the default judgment, the defendant filed a
special appearance, a motion to quash citation, a motion to withdraw and substitute counsel,
and a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court sustained the motion to with-
draw and substitute counsel. The trial court failed to rule on the other motions before the
court's plenary power expired.
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secretary of state personally. Citing the Texas Supreme Court's opinion
from the last Survey period, Capitol Brick, Inc. v. Fleming Manufacturing
Co.,134 the court rejected this argument.1 35 The defendant next argued that
the secretary of state failed to forward the copy of the process immediately;
but the court held that a five-day delay did not violate the secretary's
duty.136 Third, the defendant argued that the time period within which the
defendant must answer should begin to run from the date the secretary of
state actually forwards the process to the defendant and not from the date
the plaintiff serves the secretary of state. Observing that the secretary of
state is the defendant's agent, the court held that the time for answer begins
to run once the plaintiff serves the secretary of state with process unless the
defendant can prove a violation of due process.' 37 The defendant did not
assert a due process violation in Bonewitz. Finally, the defendant argued
that the secretary of state failed to comply with statutory requirements 38
because the secretary of state failed to mail the process with delivery re-
stricted to the defendant. The court determined, however, that the long-arm
statute which tests the sufficiency of the procedure once service is made on
the secretary does not require that the secretary restrict delivery to the de-
fendant. ' 39 The long-arm statute merely requires that service be sent by reg-
istered or certified mail, return receipt requested, and this process was
followed in Bonewitz.140 The court noted that under the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, service would be invalid because receipt of service by one
other than the defendant, who is not alleged in the plaintiff's petition to be
the authorized agent for service of process, is invalid.' 4 1
The court emphasized this latter point in American Universal Insurance
Co. v. D.B.&B., Inc.' 42 On appeal, the defendant challenged the entry of a
134. 722 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. 1986).
135. Bonewitz, 726 S.W.2d at 229.
136. Id.; see Roberts v. Niekerk, 730 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd)
(demonstrated that record must show service was forwarded). Upon reviewing the record in
Roberts, the appellate court found no evidence that the Texas secretary of state forwarded
process to the nonresident defendant by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, as
required by TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045(b) (Vernon 1986); 730 S.W.2d at
343. Since the record did not affirmatively show strict compliance with the long-arm statute,
the trial court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the defendant and erred in entering default
judgment. Id. The appellate court refused to presume that the secretary of state mailed notice
to the defendant based on an argument that the law presumes public officials perform their
duties diligently. Id. The court noted that a petition for writ of error constitutes a direct
attack on the judgment and prevents the court from indulging in presumptions in supporting
the judgment. Id. (citing McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929-30 (Tex. 1965), rev'd on
other grounds, 675 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1984)). The court concluded that the defendant, having
appeared to attack the default judgment, submitted himself to the trial court's jurisdiction and
new service was not necessary. 730 S.W.2d at 343.
137. 726 S.W.2d at 230.
138. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.045 (Vernon 1986).
139. 726 S.W.2d at 230.
140. Id. at 230-31.
141. Id.
142. 725 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also
Pharmakinetics Laboratories, Inc. v. Katz, 717 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1986, no writ) (court held that trial court does not have personal jurisdiction over a defendant
if return receipt reveals service was addressed to agent but signed by someone else; service
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default judgment because of an improper service of process. Although the
plaintiff's petition alleged the specific name of the defendant's registered
agent, and the receipt for certified mail was addressed to the registered
agent, the addressee himself did not sign the receipt. After entry of default,
the defendant filed a motion for new trial in which he raised points directed
to the merits but did not raise the defective service of process issue. At the
hearing on the motion for a new trial, the defendant's attorney acknowl-
edged valid service. The motion for a new trial was denied; thus, the default
judgment remained.
On the defendant's appeal, the plaintiff argued that the failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person made the judgment voidable, not void. The ma-
jority, however, concluded that the judgment was void for lack of personal
jurisdiction, 143 citing Browning v. Placke. 44 The majority concluded that
the failure to raise the point in the motion for new trial did not waive the
voidness of the judgment. The court held that the rules of procedure do not
require a point in a motion for a new trial as a prerequisite to an appeal from
a void default judgment based on invalide service.145 According to the ma-
jority, a void judgment cannot be waived by admitting proper service, and
the defendant was entitled to a new trial. 46
The dissent, in contrast, relying on Tidwell v. Tidwell,' 47 concluded that
the judgment was merely voidable, because only lack of subject matter juris-
diction makes a judgment void, and, thus, the defendant's admission of ser-
vice at the hearing on the motion for new trial validated the judgment.' 48
The holding in American Universal should be compared to the holding of the
Texas Supreme Court in Liberty Enterprises, Inc. v. Moore Transportation
Co., 49 which was not mentioned in American Universal. In Liberty the
court held that the defendant submitted to the court's jurisdiction by an-
nouncing ready for trial in its motion for new trial and by agreeing to the
court's order reinstating the action.' 50 Based on Liberty, the defendant in
American Universal also, arguably, made a general appearance and should
have lacked grounds to contest jurisdiction on appeal.
In UNL, Inc. v. Oak Hills Photo Finishing, Inc.'5' the plaintiff served
UNL, a foreign corporation, by serving the secretary of state in accordance
with the Texas long-arm statute.'5 2 UNL failed to appear or answer, and
invalid unless return receipt signed by appointed agent). The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
are relevant only in determining whether the secretary of state was properly served in the first
instance.
143. 725 S.W.2d at 766.
144. 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985).
145. 725 S.W.2d at 767; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(a).
146. 725 S.W.2d at 767.
147. 604 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1980, no writ).
148. 725 S.W.2d at 768 (Seerden, J., dissenting).
149. 690 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. 1985).
150. Id. at 571-72.
151. 733 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, no writ).
152. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 17.044 (Vernon 1986).
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the trial court rendered a default judgment. On appeal, UNL attacked the
judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The record included a copy of the citation directed to UNL with a sher-
iff's return indicating service on the secretary of state as agent for service on
January 6, 1986. The parties did not dispute that this document was filed
with the district court clerk on January 14, 1986. A question arose with
regard to the secretary of state's sworn statement, which recited that the
petition was served upon him on January 6, 1986, that the secretary in turn
forwarded, by certified mail, return receipt requested, a true and correct
copy of the petition to UNL on January 8, 1986, and that the green card was
returned to the secretary on January 21, 1986. The plaintiff offered the sec-
retary's sworn statement into evidence, but the record did not reflect its ad-
mission. The sworn statement was, however, attached to the statement of
facts that was part of the record on appeal, and the court reporter marked
the sworn statement with her initials, the date, February 3, 1986, and "PX-
1.9
The defendant argued that the plaintiff did not properly admit the exhibit
into evidence because the trial judge was not present during the default hear-
ing; therefore, there was no indication in the record that the secretary of
state forwarded process and, thus, no jurisdiction existed over the defendant.
The appellate court rejected this argument, even though the court reporter
signed an affidavit stating that the trial judge was not present when the testi-
mony was taken at the default hearing and that the plaintiff's attorney took
Exhibit No. 1 with him at the conclusion of the hearing instead of leaving it
in the possession of the court.15 3
The court noted that the reporter had indicated on the statement of facts
that the judge was present during the hearing, that the transcription of the
record of the proceedings truly and correctly reflected the exhibits offered by
the respective parties, and, further, that the court reporter had marked the
sworn statement of service with the date of the default hearing, the exhibit
number, and her initials. These acts, according to the court, sufficiently
showed that the statement was before the trial court and that the trial court
obtained jurisdiction. 154 Significantly, the court concluded that the allega-
tions that the trial judge was absent when the appellees proved up the allega-
tions in the petition did not support the conclusion that the plaintiff's failed
to present the statement of service to the trial court either prior to the re-
corded default hearing or later when the judge signed the judgment. 55
C. Inconvenient Forum
Forum non conveniens, a conflict of laws doctrine, provides that other-
wise valid jurisdiction should not be exercised if the forum is seriously incon-
venient for litigation, provided that a more appropriate forum is available to





the plaintiff. Houston International Televideo, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.156 in-
volved a contract action regarding a manufacturing and marketing agree-
ment between two plaintiffs and a defendant. The court upheld the parties'
choice of forum clauses, which stated that Tulsa County, Oklahoma, was the
proper venue for any action arising on the agreements. 157 The plaintiffs ar-
gued that they might be barred from suit in Oklahoma because the defend-
ant might not be subject to the Oklahoma long-arm statute, and the
Oklahoma Business Corporation Act limited unregistered corporations' use
of Oklahoma courts. The court disallowed both arguments. First, the plain-
tiffs did not prove the defendant's nonamenability to the Oklahoma long-
arm statute. 158 Second, as to the Oklahoma Corporation Act's barring the
plaintiffs, the court held that the only issue under the federal venue statute
was the defendant's capacity to be sued. 159 The plaintiffs' capacity to sue in
Oklahoma was irrelevant, the court continued, and if the plaintiffs were
barred, then they would not be excused from utilizing the proper forum be-
cause of their mistake in entering into a contract that directed suits to be
brought in a state in which they failed to comply with corporation laws. 160
In United Sonics, Inc. v. Shock, 161 however, a federal district court held a
choice of forum clause did not bind the parties since the chosen forum,
Texas, lost its contacts with the dispute during the litigation. The plaintiff
originally filed the action in New York; the action moved to Texas after the
defendant's successful forum non conveniens motion,162 based on a choice of
forum agreement. After the case moved to Texas, the defendant moved
from San Antonio to Arkansas and again filed a section 1404(a) motion 163 to
transfer to Arkansas. The plaintiff opposed the transfer, seeking to go for-
ward with the action in Texas or to return the case to New York. The court
chose the latter, holding that the transfer back to New York was proper
because the defendant no longer lived in Texas and because the action had
no other reasonable connection to Texas. 164
Boiler v. National Mediation Board 165 involved a labor dispute in the
Southern District of Texas. The defendant union moved to transfer the case
under section 1404(a) to consolidate it with a similar case in the District of
Columbia. The court considered transfer and consolidation separately and
held that consolidation was justified because the parties and issues were sub-
stantially similar. 166 The Texas plaintiffs were not parties to the District of
Columbia action, and one Texas defendant was a plaintiff in the District of
Columbia action, otherwise all parties were the same and the same contested
156. 647 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
157. Id. at 555-56.
158. Id. at 556.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 661 F. Supp. 681, 683 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982).
163. Id.
164. 661 F. Supp. at 683.
165. 647 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
166. 647 F. Supp. at 1061.
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union election comprised the issue in both cases. As for transfer, the court
noted that while the plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to deference, the
standard was reduced since the lawsuit had no connection to the forum. 167
Plaintiff's residence in Texas constituted the only connection between the
Boiler lawsuit and Texas. 168
The Fifth Circuit denied an identical request for transfer and consolida-
tion to the District of Columbia in Mobile Oil Exploration v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission.169 Mobil Oil dealt with an action by a group of
energy companies against the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) regarding the FERC's pricing regulations. The FERC statute gov-
erning gas pricing review provides for venue of multiple cases in the forum
of the first action instituted.' 70 Earlier in the same case, the Fifth Circuit
had decided an initial venue question regarding whether the Fifth Circuit or
the D.C. Circuit had venue to decide venue. The court held that both Cir-
cuits had equal status to rule on venue and that it would toss a coin to
choose which circuit decided venue. 17 1 The Fifth Circuit won the coin toss
and the right to decide venue. Upon full consideration of the venue issue,
the court decided that the convenience of the parties and the interests of
justice did not warrant transfer to the D.C. Circuit for consolidation with
similar FERC cases.172 The court held that the two sets of FERC orders
before the Fifth and D.C. Circuits sufficiently differed and did not require
review by the same circuit. 173
Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo 174 held that when a federal court dis-
missed a plaintiff's wrongful death action, based on a shipping accident in
Singapore, on forum non conveniens grounds, a Texas state court could not
reconsider those claims. The ruling turned on the fact that this was a mari-
time claim, for which federal law pre-empted the Texas wrongful death stat-
ute.175 The court noted that when a plaintiff has distinct causes of action in
state and federal courts, a forum non conveniens dismissal in federal court
would probably not bar a wrongful death claim in state court.' 76
In Lands v. St. Louis Southwestern Railroad 177 defendant moved for re-
consideration of a section 1404(a) transfer to the federal district where the
167. Id. at 1062-63.
168. The court listed five factors to consider: (1) convenience to witnesses, (2) convenience
to the parties, (3) location of books and records, (4) availability of judicial process to compel
witness attendance, and (5) the possibilities of delay or prejudice if transfer is granted. Id. at
1062. The important factors in Boiler were convenience to the parties and the delay or preju-
dice caused by transfer. Id. Transferring to the District of Columbia would cause neither of
these problems because the parties had District of Columbia counsel, except for Trans World
Airlines with New York counsel, and because of the D.C. judge's familiarity with the compan-
ion case. Id.
169. 814 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1987).
170. Id. at 1003. The opinion does not cite the FERC statute.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1003-04.
173. Id.
174. 817 F.2d 307, 314 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 343, 98 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1987).
175. Id. at 317-23.
176. Id. at 316.
177. 648 F. Sup. 322 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
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accident occurred. The court upheld its earlier decision to transfer, but
noted that reconsideration was probably unnecessary because the case had
already been transferred. 178 The court explained that the transferee court
lacked jurisdiction to review a section 1404(a) transfer, and the transferor
court lost jurisdiction to reconsider the transfer after shipping all the case
records to the other court. 179 The court held the only remedy at that point
would be a mandamus action in the Fifth Circuit. 180
Perez y Compania (Cataluna) S.A. v. Triton Pacific Maritime Corp.18 1
dealt with a breach of contract action against a ship owner for failure to
reimburse a Spanish shipping agent for fuel. The plaintiff was a Spanish
corporation acting as shipping agent for a U.S. corporation. The defendant
was a Philippine corporation and owner of a ship registered in the Philip-
pines. In April 1984, while the ship was at Pasajes, Spain, the plaintiff or-
dered and paid for a resupply of bunker fuel, for which the defendant
shipowner never reimbursed the plaintiff. The parties' agreement provided
that Spanish law would control. The plaintiff filed the in rem action in the
Southern District of Texas while the ship was docked there. The court
found that controlling Spanish law did not provide an in rem action, but the
court gave the plaintiff leave to amend for an in personam action.' 82 The
court held that the plaintiff had a valid personal claim against the ship owner
based on their agreement, and the ship owner moved for a forum non con-
veniens dismissal.183 The court granted the forum non conveniens dismissal
provided that the defendant agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Span-
ish courts.184
In Conklin & Garrett v. M/V Finnrose 185 the Fifth Circuit reversed a fed-
eral district court's dismissal of a lawsuit to recover damages to a merry-go-
round shipped from England to Florida. The district court's dismissal re-
sulted from the enforcement of a forum selection clause pointing to Finnish
jurisdiction. The defendant ship owner was a Finnish corporation, and the
bill of lading provided that a Finnish court would resolve any disputes under
Finnish law. 186 Another clause in the bill of lading provided, however, that
notwithstanding the Finnish choice of forum, that United States law applied
to disputes relating to performance within United States territorial limits. 87
The district court relied on the seminal forum selection case, Bremen v.
Zapata Offshore Co., 18 8 to favor the forum selection clause over the alterna-
tive choice of United States law. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that
178. Id. at 325.
179. Id. at 326.
180. Id.
181. 647 F. Supp. 556 (S.D. Tex. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 826 F.2d 1449 (5th Cir.
1987).
182. 647 F. Supp. at 559-60.
183. Id. at 559.
184. Id. at 560.






Bremen did not involve an alternative choice of law and thus did not factu-
ally apply to Conklin.189 In distinguishing Bremen, the Fifth Circuit pro-
vided an instructive discussion of the narrow issues of forum selection clause
enforceability.
The most significant forum non conveniens decision of the Survey period
is a Fifth Circuit opinion in a non-Texas case. In In Re: Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans, Louisiana,190 the Fifth Circuit upheld the federal district
court's denial of forum non conveniens dismissal of an action by survivors of
Uruguayans killed in an air crash in New Orleans. The defendant, Pan
American Airlines, wanted the case transferred to Uruguay, apparently be-
cause of a perceived difference in potential damages.' 9' The Fifth Circuit
held that the Warsaw Convention's' 92 provision for actions in any one of
four designated forums did not mean that a plaintiff could choose the forum
without being subject to a forum non conveniens challenge. 93 The court,
however, could not grant a forum non conveniens dismissal unless it deter-
mined that all the plaintiffs could have their claims resolved fairly.194 The
court decided that the plaintiffs could not have their claims resolved fairly in
this case because the United States was a party defendant and could not be
sued in a Uruguayan court.195 The court noted, however, that the fact that
Uruguayan damages were less was not an unfairness issue and was not a
sufficient reason for denying a forum non conveniens dismissal if the defend-
ant was otherwise entitled to move the case to Uruguay.' 96
D. Sovereign Immunity
This year's only sovereign immunity case, Falcoal, Inc. v. Turkiye Komur
Isletmeleri Kurumu,197 raised numerous conflicts issues. Falcoal encom-
passes personal jurisdiction, venue, sovereign immunity, and choice of law.
Turkiye Komur Isletmeleri Kurumu (TKI) is a Turkish government agency
that furnishes energy. In 1984, TKI decided to import some of its coal, and
therefore advertised for bids in Turkish publications. Houston-based
Falcoal submitted its bid, which TKI ultimately accepted, through its Turk-
ish agent, Zihni Dis Ticaret Ve Pazarlama A.S., a Turkish company.
Falcoal employees travelled to Ankara for the negotiations, which were con-
ducted entirely in Turkish, with Falcoal's agent Zihni translating for
Falcoal. At the negotiation's conclusion, Zihni prepared two copies of the
agreement, one in English and one in Turkish. The two versions were sup-
posedly identical, but in fact they contained contrary forum selection
189. Id. at 1442-44.
190. 821 F.2d 1147, 1169 (5th Cir. 1987).
191. In trying the case on its merits, the district court conducted a choice of law analysis
under Louisiana law, deciding that Louisiana law governed most of the issues, and Uruguayan
law at least one issue. See id. at 1169 n.38; id. at 1173-78 (Gee, J., dissenting).
192. 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1982).
193. 821 F.2d at 1161-62.
194. Id. at 1165.
195. Id. at 1168-69.
196. Id. at 1164.
197. 660 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
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clauses. The English version called for exclusive venue in Houston, while
the Turkish version called for venue in Houston only if TKI chose to sue
there, and otherwise provided for Turkish venue.
Under the contract, Falcoal agreed to post a performance bond of ten
percent of the contract price. In turn, TKI agreed to open a letter of credit
in New York to secure payment forty-five days prior to Falcoal's shipment
of coal. Falcoal posted its performance bond, but TKI failed to open the
letter of credit. Consequently, Falcoal refused to ship the coal. TKI then
drew on the Falcoal performance bond. Falcoal sued in federal district court
in Houston, alleging breach of contract for failing to open the letter of credit,
and fraud and conversion for drawing on the performance bond. TKI
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal
jurisdiction, and improper venue.
Based on its status as a foreign governmental agency TKI asserted sover-
eign immunity in its challenge of subject matter jurisdiction. Falcoal agreed
that TKI was a Turkish governmental entity, but argued that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)198 provided for jurisdiction over TKI
under two exceptions to sovereign immunity. Falcoal first argued that TKI
waived its immunity by agreeing to the Houston forum selection clause; and,
second, Falcoal argued that TKI engaged in a commercial activity. The
court disagreed with Falcoal's first argument, holding that the Turkish lan-
guage forum selection clause controlled. 199 The court concluded that with
two contrary choice of forum clauses, TKI could not be viewed as having
waived its sovereign immunity.20°
Turning to the second exception of commercial activity, the court rejected
Falcoal's first two examples. It was clear, the court held, that TKI was not
engaged in an activity that represented a commercial venture conducted in
the United States, 20 1 nor one based on activity carried out in the United
States in conjunction with a commercial enterprise of TKI being carried out
elsewhere. 20 2 The court favored Falcoal's third argument of commercial ac-
tivity: the direct effect in the United States example. In a thorough case law
analysis, the court noted contrary holdings that the direct effect is satisfied
merely by having an American corporation suffer financial injury, and the
direct effects test is not met unless the effects in the United States are suffi-
cient to establish minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction.20 3
The court resolved the contrary precedents by opting for a third prece-
dent. These cases hold that direct effects causing financial injury to Ameri-
can corporations waive sovereign immunity under the FSIA, but in doing so
merely establish statutory subject matter jurisdiction and not necessarily
personal jurisdiction.204 The court thus held that TKI waived its sovereign
198. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
199. 660 F. Supp. at 1539.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1540 (quoting from 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1977)).
202. Id. (quoting from 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1977)).
203. Id. at 1540-41.
204. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308 (2d
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immunity by its actions injuring Falcoal, but that in waiving sovereign im-
munity, TKI had not necessarily established minimum contacts with the
United States. 205
As to TKI's personal jurisdiction, Falcoal argued again that TKI's forum
selection clause permitted United States jurisdiction. Falcoal further argued
that the court should reject the Turkish language version because of TKI's
fraudulent concealment of the difference between the two versions. The
court disagreed, holding that if anyone concealed information it was
Falcoal's agent, Zihni, whom Falcoal had not sued. 2° 6
Faced with contradictory forum selection clauses, the court conducted a
Duncan v. Cessna choice of law analysis, 20 7 and determined that Turkish law
would apply because Falcoal solicited and bargained the agreement for the
contract in Turkey. 208 The court cited Turkish law Number 805, providing
that all transactions with Turkish companies must be in Turkish, and that if
a second language is used, the Turkish version controls.2°9 The court found
that under the Turkish version, TKI had not consented to United States
jurisdiction and absent TKI's consent, no other basis for minimum contact
existed. 210 The court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction. 211 The lack
of personal jurisdiction mooted the venue question, and the court dismissed
the case. 212
II. CHOICE OF LAW
A. Contracts
Readers should note the recently enacted Texas law,2 13 effective Septem-
ber 1, 1987, which requires boldfaced print for certain contractual choice of
law clauses.214 The new law applies only to contracts having both an ele-
ment of execution within Texas and a party to the contract who is an indi-
vidual Texas resident or an association or corporation created under Texas
law or that has its principal place of business in Texas.215
A second legislative development affecting Texas is the United States' rati-
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Crimson Semiconductor, Inc. v. Electronium,
629 F. Supp. 903, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
205. 660 F. Supp. at 1541.
206. Id. at 1542.
207. Id (citing Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Tex. 1984)).




212. Id. at 1542-43.
213. TEx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 35.53 (Vernon 1987).
214. The new law states:
If a contract to which this section applies contains a provision making the con-
tract or any conflict arising under the contract subject to the laws of another
state, to litigation... . or to arbitration in another state, the provision must be
set out in boldface print. If the provision is not set out in boldface print, the





fication of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods.2 16 The convention is the international version of Article Two
of the Uniform Commercial Code. Like the UCC, the Convention has
choice of law provisions. Most notable is the implication that transactions
falling within the Convention's purview will automatically be governed by
the Convention unless the contracting parties specifically opt out with a
choice of law clause. The effective date is January 1, 1988.
The Fifth Circuit raised two interesting choice of law questions in Kucel v.
Walter E. Heller & Co. 2 17 Kucel owned an airplane financed by Heller
Company. After making sixty-two monthly payments, Kucel was unable to
continue payments. Kucel sought to sell the plane and pay off Heller, but
Kucel and Heller could not agree on the remaining balance. Kucel paid the
balance Heller requested so as not to lose the sale, but demanded an ac-
counting. Heller accepted payment and released the lien, but retained its
right of action against Kucel for any matters occurring before the release.
Kucel waited two months for the accounting on his note, then sued Heller
to recover the alleged overpayment on the loan. After a bench trial, the
court awarded Kucel $42,892.40 in overpayments and reduced the award by
$1,114.90 in late fees Kucel owed Heller. The court also awarded prejudg-
ment interest under Illinois law and post-judgment interest under federal
law. Kucel then requested attorneys' fees under Texas law, and the court
complied. Heller asked for reconsideration, arguing that Illinois law gov-
erned attorneys' fees and did not allow them in this case. The district court
disagreed and imposed sanctions of $500.00 on Heller's attorney. Heller ap-
pealed to the Fifth Circuit, and Kucel cross appealed on the district court's
failure to apply Illinois law on the question of calculating interest on the
promissory note. 2 18
The Fifth Circuit made several adjustments to the district court's opinion.
The Fifth Circuit held that attorneys' fees related to the substantive law of
the case, thus making Texas law applicable only if Texas law governed the
substantive issues. 219 Noting that the parties' loan agreement called for the
application of Illinois law, the court held that under Texas choice of law
rules the parties' agreement controlled, and Illinois law governed the sub-
stantive issues in the case. 220 The court concluded that the trial court ap-
plied Illinois law to construe the note and to award prejudgment interest, but
reimbursed Kucel for interest overpayment and awarded attorneys' fees
under Texas law.2 21 The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the application of laws
and held that the note's choice of Illinois law governed all of Kucel's claims,
216. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97/19 (1980); U.S. SENATE TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 22-43 (1983); see Winship, A Bibliography of Commentaries on the United Nations
International Sales Convention, 21 INT'L LAW. 585 (1987).
217. 813 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1987).
218. Id. at 69-70.





which the court described as "inextricably intertwined. '222 Because Illinois
law governed all of Kucel's substantive claims, and because Illinois law did
not permit recovery of attorneys' fees, the court reversed Kucel's attorneys'
fee award. 223
Kucel argued on appeal that Heller had waived any claim that Illinois law
governed attorneys' fees. The court disagreed, first observing that under fed-
eral law, Heller did not have to plead the application of Illinois law to pre-
serve the question, nor did Heller need to prove the content of Illinois law
because the court must take judicial notice of all states' laws.224 The court
indicated that Heller was only required to call the question to the court's
attention in time for judicial consideration. 225 The court held that Heller
222. Id. While the Kucel court correctly applied the promissory note's choice of law clause
to all of Kucel's claims, readers should note the practice of depecage. This is the practice of
splitting issues in a case, applying one state's law to one issue and another state's law to a
second issue. The Texas Supreme Court mandated this practice for Texas courts in Duncan v.
Cessna, 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984), stating that "in all choice of law cases, except those
contract cases in which the parties have agreed to a valid choice of law cause, the law of the
state with the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be applied to
resolve that issue." 665 S.W.2d at 421 (emphasis added).
223. 813 F.2d at 73-74.
224. Id. at 74.
225. Id. The court's ruling on pleading the applicability and content of Illinois law was
correct, but the court's citations do not fully support it. The court cited two authorities, a case
and a treatise, for the proposition that Heller need not plead the applicability of Illinois law in
order to preserve the claim. The case, Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Norris Grain Co.,
343 F.2d 670, 685 (8th Cir. 1965), does not address this issue. Instead, Lumbermen's held that
when a party pursues a claim under a particular state's law, the party need not plead that law
in order to preserve the claim. Id. In pertinent part, Lumbermen's held that if a party alleged
a contract was "an Illinois contract, the party relying on the provision of Illinois law need not
expressly plead that Illinois law." Id. In context, Lumbermen's states only that a party need
not plead the content of Illinois law. Lumbermen's made no statement as to the need to plead
the applicability of Illinois law.
The Kucel opinion also cites C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 1253 (1969) for the same proposition: the non-necessity of pleading applicability of
another state's law. Wright and Miller state that "it is not necessary to plead state law,
whether it be the forum state's law, or the law of another state." Id. Read in context, this
states only that a party need not plead the content of the applicable state's law, and does not
address the need to plead applicability. Wright and Miller continue:
[H]owever, in cases having multi-state contacts, the pleader may be well advised
to include an allegation as to which state's law he intends to rely on when he can
do so at the pleading stage, even though he need not plead its content, since he
does not have the obligation to call the applicability of another state's law to the
court's attention.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
In reading the cases cited in C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, and other cases on point, the
following synthesis emerges: in federal court, one need not plead the applicability of any
state's law; however, one must raise the argument of governing law, if other than forum law,
by some means at a reasonable time before the trial court renders judgment on the merits. See
Jannenga v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Prudential Ins. v.
Carlson, 126 F.2d 607, 611 (10th Cir. 1942). Even though the federal appellate court may
refuse to consider applying a different state's law if that law was not raised at trial, it is not
required to. The court may remand such cases for consideration under the applicable law.
Pecheur Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942); Nagoya Assoc., Inc. v.
Esquire, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 379, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). At no time in federal practice must one
plead and prove the content of any state's law, because federal courts must take judicial notice
of all states' laws. Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S. 218, 223 (1885); Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty
Co. v. Norris Grain Co., 343 F.2d 670, 685 (8th Cir. 1965); Jaeger v. Raymark Indus., 610 F.
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had done so by the fact that the choice of law provision was in the note
drafted by Heller, and by including Illinois law in its motion to dismiss at
the time the pretrial order was filed. 226 Heller's failure to mention Illinois
law in the pretrial order did not waive the argument on appeal because the
pretrial order mentioned the outstanding motion to dismiss, and there was
no agreement as to the application of Texas or Illinois law, leaving choice of
law unresolved. 227
The Fifth Circuit also applied a false conflicts analysis to Kucel's cross-
appeal. 228 Kucel argued that the trial court erred in not calculating the
promissory note's interest rate at nine percent as required by Illinois law for
loans lacking an interest agreement. The applicable Illinois law provided for
interest at the judgment rate at the place of payment from the date of the
contract unless the parties specified otherwise in their agreement. 229 The
court observed that the UCC provisions were identical under both Texas and
Illinois law; thus, it did not matter which state's law applied. 230 Under
either state's law, the interest would be assessed from the judgment interest
rate at the place of payment, in this case Illinois. There was no conflict.
Moreover, there was no trial error because section 3-118 did not apply. 231
The Fifth Circuit held that although the loan did not specify an interest rate
or an annual percentage rate, it did not provide for interest, thus precluding
application of section 3-118.232
Singer v. Lexington Insurance Co.233 concerned unpaid insurance claims
on thoroughbred horses located throughout North America and western Eu-
rope. The conflict of laws arose between the Massachusetts insurance law of
good faith and fair dealing and the absence of that doctrine in Texas at the
time of the Singer decision. 234 Singer first discussed several presumptions as
to the parties' imputed intent for the policy's governing law, along with the
Supp. 784, 787-88 (E.D. Wis. 1985). Nevertheless, although a federal court may not refuse to
apply the law of another state merely because it was not affirmatively plead and proved,
Pecheur, 315 U.S. at 667, a court may decline to apply such law where the offering party fails
to inform the court of the law's content. Jannenga, 285 F.2d at 170; Prudential, 126 F.2d at
611.
Thus, applicability need not be plead, but should be raised by some means at a reasonable
time before the judgment on the merits. If it is not reasonably raised, the appellate court may
ignore the argument that another law should govern, or it may remand for reconsideration
under the newly argued law. Content, the substance of the governing law, need not be plead or
proved, but the party should make an informal proof of content to the court (e.g. by offering a
photocopy); failure to do so entitles the trial court to ignore the remedies under the unknown
law, although the appellate court has the discretion to remand.
226. 813 F.2d at 74.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 70.
229. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-118(d) (Smith-Hurd 1963).
230. 813 F.2d at 70, comparing ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, § 3-118 (Smith-Hurd 1963) with
TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
231. 813 F.2d at 70-71.
232. Id.
233. 658 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
234. After Singer's holding in late 1986, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the common
law action for an insurer's breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See Arnold v.
National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987). Had the Singer deci-
sion been a few months later, it would have been a false conflict.
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rules for determining where the contract was made for choice of law pur-
poses.235 The Singer court also considered the Texas Insurance Code,236
which imposes a choice of Texas law on certain insurance contracts made
with Texas residents, but held that it was inapplicable in the case at hand
because the policy was not issued in the course of Lexington's Texas busi-
ness, even though Lexington did Texas business. 237 The court then held that
the difference between Texas and Massachusetts laws did not, in this case,
make the enforcement of the Massachusetts law contrary to Texas public
policy. 2 38 Finally, the court considered a paragraph in the insurance policy
stating that in the event of an unpaid claim, Lexington would submit to "the
jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States"
for an adjudication under the law of that forum.239 The court disagreed
with Lexington that this represented a contractual choice of forum agree-
ment. 24 ° The court pointed out that forum law included the forum's choice
of law rules, and the paragraph thus did not point to the forum's substantive
law alone.241 The court added that if the parties intended the clause as a
choice of law, they should have been more explicit than simply indicating a
willingness to submit to forum law.242
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp.2 4 3 dealt with the enforcement of a noncom-
petition clause under Florida law in Texas. Wackenhut Corporation had
hired DeSantis to manage its Houston area office that provided private se-
curity services to a forty-county area. As a condition of employment DeSan-
tis signed a noncompetition contract in which he agreed to refrain from
participating in any business or other endeavor in competition with Wacken-
hut within a prescribed geographical area for two years after termination of
his employment with Wackenhut. Additionally, DeSantis agreed not to dis-
close the company's client list or any other confidential or proprietary infor-
mation. The agreement specifically called for Florida law to govern
questions of interpretation and enforcement.
DeSantis resigned on March 15, 1984, in a disagreement with Wacken-
hut.244 In April 1984, one month after leaving Wackenhut, DeSantis mailed
announcements of his new business ventures, which included marketing se-
curity devices and providing guard services. Wackenhut sued to enforce the
noncompetition agreement, and DeSantis counterclaimed for interference
with his business. Applying Florida law, the Texas jury found various issues
235. 658 F. Supp. at 342-43.
236. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981).
237. 658 F. Supp. at 343-44, (citing Howell v. American Livestock Ins. Co., 483 F.2d 1354,
1361 (5th Cir. 1973); Austin Bldg. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 432 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex.
1968)).





243. 732 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ granted).
244. DeSantis claimed he was forced out in a disagreement about the Houston office's prof-
itability. Wackenhut claimed that DeSantis made an unethical business solicitation.
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for each party. 245 Pertinent to this discussion, the jury found that DeSantis
had not caused Wackenhut irreparable harm, an element necessary for re-
covery under Florida law.246 The trial court disregarded this jury finding
and entered judgment for Wackenhut on the grounds that Florida law pre-
sumed irreparable harm for the mere breach of a noncompetition
agreement. 247
The appellate court addressed two choice of law questions. One was rou-
tine, while one was unusual. The routine question addressed whether the
contract's choice of Florida law would control. The court of appeals held
did, citing Texas case law that contractual choice of law agreements con-
trolled as long as the agreement was reasonably related to the chosen state
and did not contravene the public policy of the forum state.248 The court
held that Florida had a reasonable relation 249 to the noncompetition agree-
ment because Wackenhut's headquarters were in Florida, Wackenhut inter-
viewed and hired DeSantis in Florida, and the Florida headquarters closely
supervised the Houston office. 250 The court also found, in a questionable
analysis, that Texas had no strong public policy against the application Flor-
ida law.2 51
Having decided that Florida law controlled, the court turned to the sec-
ond question of the extent of its control. DeSantis argued that the Florida
presumption of irreparable harm from any violation of a noncompetition
clause was a procedural norm and thus inapplicable anywhere but in Florida
courts. The appellate court agreed not to use the Florida procedure in the
Texas case, but added that it was often difficult to characterize a law as
procedural or substantive.252 According to the court, procedural rules regu-
245. 732 S.W.2d at 31.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 35 (citing Capraro v. Lanier Bus. Prod., Inc., 466 So. 2d 212, 213 (Fla. 1985)).
248. 732 S.W.2d at 32 (citing Woods Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson Ingram Dev.
Co., 642 F.2d 744, 746, 750 (5th Cir. 1981); First Commerce Realty Investors v. K-F Land
Co., 617 S.W.2d 806, 808-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105 (Vernon Supp. 1987)).
249. The requirement of a reasonable relation between the contract and the chosen state is
an aspect of legislative jurisdiction. See George, Choice of Law Outline for Texas Courts, 18
TEX. TECH L. REV. 785 (1987).
250. 732 S.W.2d at 32.
251. Id. The court of appeals noted that Florida law was permitted both by Texas case law
and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 15.01-40 (Vernon Supp. 1988). The court noted in particular the 1987 Texas Supreme
Court case of Hill v. Mobil Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1987), which adopted
a stricter standard for recognition of noncompetition clauses. 732 S.W.2d at 33. The DeSantis
court held that Hill "does not vitiate such reasonable agreements. In that case the supreme
court specified four criteria that a covenant not to compete must meet in order to be deemed
reasonable and then found that the particular covenant at issue ... did not meet several of
those criteria." Id. (citations omitted). In dismissing Hill, the DeSantis court failed to apply
Hill's criteria to the DeSantis facts and ignored Hill's seminal language adopting a new stan-
dard for noncompetition clauses in Texas. In particular, Hill quoted a Connecticut case stat-
ing "[tihe changing conditions of life modify from time to time the reasons for determining
whether the public interest requires that a restrictive stipulation should be deemed void as
against public policy." 725 S.W.2d at 172 (quoting Samuel Stores, Inc. v. Abrams, 94 Conn.
248, 252, 108 A.2d 541, 543 (1919)).
252. 732 S.W.2d at 35.
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late the conduct of a trial and substantive rules affect the outcome of the
issue. 253 The court explained that a departure from the general rule occurs
when a foreign state's rule concerning a presumption or a burden of proof
actually affects the parties' substantive rights rather than merely regulates
procedure. 254 When the enforcement of such a rule will not violate the pub-
lic policy of the forum state, that rule, rather than the law of the forum, will
control.255 The Texas appellate court examined the Florida noncompetition
statute and concluded that the presumption of irreparable harm was a sub-
stantive rule, and thus controlled. 256 This conclusion entitled Wackenhut to
the trial court's award of damages.
Readers should note that the court of appeals did not use the Restatement
(Second) in the initial choice of law analysis; it was unnecessary since a valid
choice of law agreement existed. Texas law calls for the Restatement (Sec-
ond)'s most significant relationship test only when no valid contractual
choice of law exists. 257 Readers should further note the court's reliance on
the Restatement (Second) in the more difficult problem of characterizing the
Florida presumption as substantive or procedural. This represents yet an-
other extension of the Restatement (Second)'s application in Texas courts,
although the entire Restatement (Second) has yet to be endorsed by the
Texas Supreme Court. 25 8
Davidson v. Great National Life Insurance Co. 259 involved an action to
recover on the life insurance coverage on the plaintiff's ex-husband Dauod
Alquassab. Alquassab applied for the insurance in May 1980. Alquassab
first named his business partner as beneficiary, but he later changed the ben-
eficiary to his ex-wife, Phyllis Davidson. In February 1981, six months after
designating Phyllis as beneficiary, Alquassab went to Tel Aviv. Before leav-
ing, Alquassab allegedly defrauded First City Bank in Houston of $1.5 mil-
lion and committed other fraudulent acts on other banks. On February 11,
1981, a body was discovered about one hundred yards from the hotel where
Alquassab was registered. The body had been struck by a car and dragged
faced down. Ms. Davidson notified Great National on February 12, 1981,
and the body was buried in Israel on February 13, 1981.
Phyllis Davidson made a formal claim to Great National on June 1, 1981.
Great National rescinded the policy and refused to pay the claim. Davidson
sued, and Great National defended with allegations of fraud insofar as Al-
quassab faked his own death. Davidson won at trial, with the jury finding
that Alquassab was dead, that Alquassab did not misrepresent anything ma-
terial to the insurance policy, and that while some of Alquassab's representa-
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, §§ 133, 134, comments).
256. 732 S.W.2d at 35-36.
257. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
258. In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984), the Texas
Supreme Court adopted only the "most significant relationship test" of the Restatement (Sec-
ond), which is delineated at RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 6 and qualified by nu-
merous other sections in the Restatement.
259. 737 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1987).
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tions to Great National were false, they were not made with the intent to
deceive. 26 o
A major point in Great National's appeal focused on the choice of law
controversy surrounding the testimony of Schmuel Carmelli, a high ranking
Tel Aviv police officer, who testified about Alquassab's death. Great Na-
tional attempted to discredit Carmelli by asking about discrepancies in the
investigation and Carmelli's knowledge of Alquassab's background.
Carmelli refused to answer these questions at trial and claimed police privi-
lege under Israeli law. Under the basic choice of law rule, the forum law
controls most evidentiary matters, but privilege is controlled by the law
where the privileged conduct occurred. 26' Carmelli's claimed privilege,
thus, should be honored if recognized under Israeli law.
Great National objected to Carmelli's use of the privilege and moved to
strike his testimony, as well as, for a mistrial, but the trial court refused.262
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the privilege de-
nied Great National an opportunity to cross-examine Carmelli.263 As re-
ported in last year's Survey, 264 the court of appeals recognized that Israeli
law governed the claimed privilege, but held that the plaintiff did not prove
the privilege's existence under Israeli law.265 The court of appeals denied
the privilege and remanded to the trial court so that Great National could
cross-examine Carmelli on these issues. Prior to remand, plaintiff appealed
to the Texas Supreme Court.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding that the
plaintiff failed to prove the privilege under Israeli law, and it was thus
waived. 266 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on the remand
for a new cross-examination of Carmelli, however, reasoning that Carmelli's
testimony was harmless error because of other substantial testimony proving
Alquassab's death. 267 The supreme court noted that Great National had
several other trial objections on appeal and remanded the case to the court of
appeals to consider Great National's other objections. 268
B. Torts
Tennimon v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. 269 involved a wrongful death
claim brought eleven years after the helicopter crash at Fort Campbell, Ken-
tucky, which killed Thomas Tennimon. Tennimon's widow learned immedi-
ately of the crash and four days later asked her husband's commanding
260. Id. at 313.
261. Id. at 314.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See George & Pederson, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J.
383, 421 (1987).
265. Great Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Davidson, 708 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986,
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 737 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1987).
266. 737 S.W.2d at 315.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. 823 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1987).
1988]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
officer what had happened. He told her that pilot error caused the crash.
Mrs. Tennimon did not inquire further until her mother referred her to a
1984 newspaper article regarding problems with Bell's mechanical rotors.
Mrs. Tennimon and her sons sued Texas-based Bell in a Texas federal court
in 1984 for Thomas's death.
Bell argued that the statutes of limitations of Texas, Kentucky, and Flor-
ida barred the claim. Plaintiffs responded that the sons' minority and the
defect discovery rule tolled some or all of the three states' limitations peri-
ods. The district court agreed with Bell and dismissed. 270 Plaintiffs
appealed.
The Fifth Circuit first inquired as to the governing substantive law. The
court noted that because the death occurred in 1973, plaintiffs had no claim
under Texas law because the 1973 Texas wrongful death statute271 did not
apply to deaths outside of Texas.272 For deaths outside of the state, Texas
law called for the application of the substantive law of the place where the
harm occurred: the lex locus delicti. 273 The court, thus, held that Texas law
directed the application of Kentucky's substantive law.274 In so holding, the
court applied a choice of law rule repealed in 1975.275 This may seem un-
warranted because of the general perception that choice of law rules are pro-
cedural and not subject to retroactive application. The court was,
nonetheless, correct, at least according to precedent. Prior to 1975, article
4678276 was a statutory choice of law rule; it was part of the Texas Wrongful
Death Act and thereby deemed substantive law. The court might have ruled
that choice of law rules, even statutory ones, constitute procedural rules that
remain viable only until repealed. 277
The court did not use current choice of law rules because of its reliance on
a Gutierrez v. Collins278 footnote stating that the 1975 amendment to article
4678 was not retroactive.279. The Gutierrez footnote, and the Tennimon
court's use of it to apply a lex locus delicti rule repealed in 1975, are argua-
bly correct. The justification is that article 4678 was an integral part of the
substantive wrongful death act in 1973, and that if the court applies any part
of the 1973 law, the court must apply all of the law.280
Having chosen Kentucky law, the court turned to the statute of limita-
270. Id. at 69-70.
271. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671-4678 (Vernon 1952), repealed by Act of June
19, 1975, ch. 530, § 3 1975 Tex. Gen. & Spec. Laws, 1382, (now codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986)).
272. 823 F.2d at 69.
273. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (repealed 1975).
274. 823 F.2d at 70-71.
275. Id. at 70-71 n.l.
276. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (repealed 1975).
277. Under this view, the court still would have decided that the 1973 Texas wrongful
death law applied only to deaths in Texas and that plaintiffs' claim would be governed by some
other law. Instead of using the repealed article 4678 that invoked lex locus delicti, the court
could have applied current choice of law rules. If it had, the result would have been the same.
278. 583 S.W.2d 312, 317-18 n.3 (Tex. 1979).
279. 823 F.2d at 70-71 n.l.
280. Id. at 71 n.2.
[Vol. 42
CONFLICT OF LAWS
tions arguments. The trial court applied only the Texas statute of limita-
tions to all limitations issues, reasoning that the Kentucky statute of
limitations was procedural rather than substantive and, thus, not applicable
in Texas courts. Plaintiffs did not dispute the application of the Texas limi-
tations periods, but argued that Kentucky law additionally favored tolling
the limitations period on the issue of the sons' minority. The Fifth Circuit
upheld the trial court, finding first that the Texas law on the defect discovery
rule was, by legislative mandate, not available to toll the limitations period
for wrongful death cases. 28' As to minority tolling, the court found that,
although Texas does toll for minors, the Texas rule did not apply because the
controlling Kentucky wrongful death law did not allow minors to bring ac-
tions if a personal representative such as Mrs. Tennimon existed.2 82
Some may see the court's reasoning as vacillating here, by applying the
Texas limitations rules when it hurts the plaintiffs and then switching to the
Kentucky law on the minority tolling issue to further undercut the plaintiffs'
claims. Nonetheless, the court's analysis appears proper. The court prop-
erly applied the Kentucky wrongful death statute to all appropriate issues:
the Kentucky statute has no built-in limitations period, so the court used the
forum's limitation period; the Kentucky statute did not recognize actions for
minors, thus, rendering the minority tolling issue irrelevant. This represents
a proper analysis of the application of another state's substantive law.
On the other hand, it is not the only analysis. The Restatement (Second)
recommends ignoring the substantive and procedural labels for limitations
issues and the application of the statute of limitation of the state having the
most significant relationship to the issue in question. 28 3 Under this analysis,
the proper statute of limitation might be Kentucky's as the site of the crash
and the state whose wrongful death law controlled. Similarly, Florida's limi-
tation might be appropriate, especially on minority tolling, as the plaintiffs'
domicile. Finally, the Texas limitation period might apply as furthering the
forum's interest and in meeting the Texas defendant's expectations of how
long it might be subject to suit in Texas courts.
Johansen v. EI. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. 28 4 arose from the plaintiff's
personal injury in Libya in 1980 due to an oil well casing gun explosion.
Three years later Johansen sued Du Pont and eight other defendants; the
court dismissed all but Du Pont for forum non conveniens. Johansen as-
serted claims for negligence and strict liability in his original complaint, then
two years later and almost five years after the accident he amended his origi-
nal complaint to add a breach of implied warranty of merchantability and
fitness claim. Du Pont argued that the two-year statute of limitations for
personal injury should disallow all claims.2 85
The federal district court held for Du Pont on all points. The court ruled
281. Id. at 72 (interpreting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5526(5) (Vernon Supp. 1980-
81)).
282. Id. at 73-74.
283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 142 comment e (1986 Revision).
284. 810 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 148, 98 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1987).
285. Now codified as TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986).
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that Johansen's original claims for negligence and strict liability were time
barred under the Texas two-year limitation period, and that the original
complaint did not sufficiently state a claim for implied warranty. 2 6 The
court further held that the Texas relation back statute287 did not save the
implied warranty claim because the original claim was time barred.288 The
court held that if the federal relation back rule289 applied, instead of the
Texas rule, the plaintiff's claims were still proscribed. 29° Finally, the court
denied Johansen's late move to amend to add express warranty claims, rul-
ing that such claims would also be barred by the statute of limitations.
29 1
Johansen appealed. He did not dispute the dismissal of negligence and
strict liability claims, but argued that his original complaint had stated a
claim for implied warranty and that the claim fell within the four-year UCC
limitation period 292 instead of the two-year tort period applied by the trial
court. Alternatively, Johansen argued that even if the original complaint did
not state an implied warranty claim, the federal relation back rule
293
brought the warranty claim within the original filing, placing it within the
UCC's four-year limitation period. Johansen also argued that his amended
express warranty claim related back to the original filing and therefore
should be allowed.
The Fifth Circuit agreed that Johansen should have another chance, at
least on the implied and express warranty claims. 294 The Fifth Circuit first
held that the federal relation back rule applied and that it allowed filing of
the express and implied warranty claims. 295 Nonetheless, those claims
would still have to fall within the appropriate statute of limitation.296 If the
two-year personal injury limitation applied, Johansen had no claim; on the
other hand, if the four-year UCC period applied, he did.
297
The district court applied the two-year period because it believed the
Texas UCC's four-year period was substantive and therefore inapplicable
under article 4678,298 calling for the application of Texas procedure to for-
eign personal injury claims. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that sec-
tion 2.275 was procedural in spite of its attachment to the substantive UCC
law. 29 9 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the distinction between the procedural
and substantive status of the limitation, noting that limitations are presumed
286. 810 F.2d at 1379.
287. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539B (now codified as TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.068 (Vernon 1986)).
288. 810 F.2d at 1379.
289. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
290. 810 F.2d at 1379.
291. Id.
292. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
293. FED. R. CIV. PROC. 15(c).
294. 810 F.2d at 1380.
295. Id. at 1379.
296. Id. at 1381.
297. Id. at 1380.
298. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (repealed 1975) (now codified as TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1986)).
299. 810 F.2d at 1381.
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procedural: when attached to substantive law, they do not lose their proce-
dural characterization unless the substantive law modifies the common
law.3 00 Because the UCC's actions for breach of warranty merely restate a
common law action, section 2.275 remained procedural. 301 Section 2.275 of
the UCC, thus, qualified for application under article 4678, supplementing
the personal injury period of two years. Johansen's warranty claims, deemed
to relate back to the filing three years after the accident, were timely. 30 2
The court then charted the course for the district court on remand. The
district court would have to decide which substantive law governed this
claim and whether that law had causes of action for breach of express and
implied warranty.30 3 If the state's substantive law did, the court would next
have to determine whether the governing law had a substantive statute of
limitation that displaced Texas's procedural limitation period, and if so,
whether the other state's law barred Johansen's warranty claims.3 4 If Jo-
hansen could clear all these hurdles, then his claim would be heard on the
merits. The Fifth Circuit also affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the neg-
ligence and strict liability claims as time barred.30 5
This year's most interesting application of foreign law, Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 3 0 6 contains no choice of law analysis. The parties agreed in the
trial court that New York law applied to the major issue, tortious interfer-
ence with a contract, under Texas's most significant relationship test.30 7
Consequently, the court of appeals opinion merely notes the parties' stipula-
tion to New York law. 30 8 While some have criticized the Texas trial court's
accuracy in applying New York law, 30 9 at least one source has criticized the
parties' failure to argue choice of law.310 Of course, Texaco might want only
New York law applied to preserve its argument that New York law required
a written contract as a predicate for tortious interference. 31 1 Nevertheless,







306. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Most read-
ers are familiar with the Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co. background. For those who are not,
Pennzoil sued Texaco in a Texas district court for allegedly interfering with Pennzoil's offer to
buy Getty Oil. For additional details, see Baron & Baron, The Pennzoil-Texaco Dispute: An
Independent Analysis, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 253 (1986).
307. See Baron & Baron, supra note 306, at 260-61. Delaware law and federal law also
applied to certain issues in the case.
308. 729 S.W.2d at 787.
309. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), injunction
aff'd on appeal, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986). See also Baron & Baron, supra note 306, at 260-
61.
310. See Baron & Baron, supra note 306, passim.
311. The Texas trial court and court of appeals did not interpret New York law as requir-
ing a written contract, but critics believe New York law does require a writing in this instance.




law, under which Pennzoil may have had a stronger claim. 31 2
According to one commentary, Texas law arguably applied under three
factors of the most significant relationship test: the relevant policies of the
forum, the protection of justified expectations, and the basic policies under-
lying the particular field of law. 31 3 The authors chose not to analyze these
factors, but they are correct in stating that the adversary system did not
function to expose fully the policy arguments deemed so crucial by recent
Texas case law and by Restatement (Second) section 6 .3 14 On the other
hand, the authors also correctly state that even if the court had conducted a
full choice of law analysis, nothing indicated that the outcome would have
been different.3 15
The United States Supreme Court issued a ruling corollary to the Texas
dispute, concerning Texaco's New York federal court challenge to
Pennzoil's enforcement of the judgment pending the Texas appeal. After the
Houston trial court awarded Pennzoil an $11 billion verdict, Texaco claimed
it could not post the supersedeas bond for the judgment, which exposed Tex-
aco to immediate collection. To prevent this, Texas sought injunctive relief
from a New York federal district court, alleging that the Texas supersedeas
law violated its civil rights. 316 Texaco won injunctive relief in the federal
district court and from the Second Circuit.3 17 During this Survey period,
however, the United States Supreme Court reversed, ruling 8-1 that the
Texas supersedeas law did not violate Texaco's civil rights merely because
judgment enforcement would arguably bankrupt Texaco.3 18
C. Other Cases
Kneeland v. NCAA 3 19 involved an action by journalists to force the de-
fendants, the NCAA and the Southwest Conference, to allow the journalists
to inspect information the NCAA gathered in its investigation of certain
universities in the Southwest Conference. The plaintiffs sought the informa-
tion under the Texas Open Records Act. 320 The NCAA argued that the Act
312. Texas law allows for the enforcement of an oral agreement if the parties intend to be
bound. See Vick v. McPherson, 360 S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1962, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Baron & Baron, supra note 306, at 262.
313. See Baron & Baron, supra note 306, at 265-68.
314. Id. at 261.
315. Id.
316. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 251-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), injunction
affirmed on appeal, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
317. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1157 (2d Cir. 1986).
318. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1529, 95 L. Ed. 2d 1, 20(1987). Justice
Powell wrote the majority opinion, holding that the federal courts should have abstained and
that the federal district court should not have addressed the constitutional grounds of the
Texas supersedeas law because the Texas courts had not reviewed that question. 107 S. Ct. at
1529, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 20. Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Scalia joined Justice
Powell. In separate concurring opinions, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens all agreed
that the Texas supersedeas law did not violate due process. Id. Justice Blackmun concurred in
the result, but argued that Texaco's due process claim was litigable in federal court, except that
a Pullman abstention was required. See 107 S. Ct. at 1535, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 27.
319. 650 F. Supp. 1047 (W.D. Tex. 1988).
320. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp. 1988).
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had no extra-territorial application, and that even if it did, Texas law did not
control the case. The district court disagreed on both points, holding that
the Act's purpose, ensuring public access to information, could not be real-
ized unless the Act applied to foreign entities meeting the Act's definition of
governmental bodies. 321 As to choice of law, the court held that Texas had
the most significant relationship to the case because the journalists resided in
Texas, eight of the nine members of the defendant Southwest Conference
were in Texas, and the NCAA conducted a number of investigations in
Texas. 322 The court resolved several other challenges to the Act's applica-
tion, not relevant to this discussion, and ordered the defendants to produce
the information for in camera inspection.3 23
Hilsher v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc.324 considered the
question of an expert witness's disqualification based on his alleged igno-
rance of the New York law underpinning his testimony. The lawsuit con-
cerned a commodity broker's action to recover deficits on commodities
accounts Hilsher had allegedly mismanaged. Merrill Lynch won at trial,
and Hilsher appealed. 325 One point of alleged appellate error concerned the
testimony of Paul Goree, an operating manager for Merrill Lynch in New
York. Goree testified on the computation of interest charged on the inves-
tors' accounts with Merrill Lynch. Hilsher argued that Goree was not quali-
fied as an expert and, further, that Goree lacked knowledge of New York
law, the basis of his testimony on interest rates. The court of appeals denied
Hilsher's challenge, holding that Goree's knowledge or lack of knowledge of
New York law did not affect admissibility, but only affected the weight and
sufficiency of his testimony.326
Williams v. Home Indemnity Co. 3 2 7 represented an attempt to establish a
common law marriage so that the plaintiff could collect widow's workers'
compensation benefits. The plaintiff, Robin Williams, began living with her
purported husband while the two attended college in Virginia in 1980. The
two conducted a private ceremony that consisted of placing their hands on a
Bible and vowing that they were married. They lived together from that
point on. They moved to New York where they continued to cohabit and
had a child. They decided to move the Texas, but prior to moving the fam-
ily, the putative husband (unnamed throughout the opinion) came to Texas
to find a job and rent an apartment. Before Robin and the child could join
him, the man was murdered during a convenience store robbery.
The trial court applied the older Texas choice of law rule, which directed
that the law of the site of the marriage determined the validity of a mar-
riage. 328 The trial court took judicial notice of the laws of Virginia and New
321. 650 F. Supp. at 1058.
322. Id. at 1059.
323. Id. at 1063.
324. 717 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
325. Id. at 437.
326. Id. at 442.
327. 722 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
328. Id. at 787.
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York, found them both to deny common law marriages, and held against
Robin.3 29 Robin appealed, arguing that the court should apply the newer
Texas choice of law rule, the most significant relationship test, 330 and under
that test choose Texas substantive law, which recognizes common law
marriages. 33 1
The court of appeals observed that the most significant relationship test
might control, but found no need to proceed since there was no conflict in.
the results.332 The court noted that Texas recognized only those common
law marriages in which the parties openly cohabitated in Texas as husband
and wife and represented to others that they were married.33 3 Because
Robin had not lived in Texas prior to the murder, Texas law did not apply to
her marriage. 334 Either Virginia or New York law, both of which denied her
claim, governed the validity of the marriage. 335 Readers should note that
Williams represents a false conflict in that even though Texas law differed
from New York's and Virginia's, the outcome was the same.
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments create Texas conflicts of laws in two ways: the local
enforcement of non-Texas judgments, both of sister states and foreign coun-
tries, and the preclusion effect of foreign lawsuits on local lawsuits. Foreign
judgments include sister state and foreign country judgments, but not federal
court judgments from other states, because courts summarily enforce those
judgments as local federal court judgments. 336 Texas recognizes two meth-
ods of enforcing foreign judgments: the common law method of using the
foreign judgment as the basis of a local lawsuit, and the more direct proce-
dure under the Uniform Foreign Judgments Acts. 337
A. Enforcement
1. The Foreign Judgments Acts
Since 1981, Texas has used two uniform acts to recognize and enforce
foreign judgments, although their adoption did not displace the common law
enforcement method. 338 The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act (UEFJA)339 provides for Texas enforcement of non-Texas judgments
329. Id.
330. See Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 421 (Tex. 1984).
331. 722 S.W.2d at 787-88; see Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d 459, 462-63 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1985, no writ); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1975).
332. 722 S.W.2d at 788; see Seth v. Seth, 694 S.W.2d at 462-63.
333. 722 S.W.2d 788 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1975)).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
337. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 1986).
338. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 1986) (formerly TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5).
339. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 1986) (formerly TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5).
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entitled to full faith and credit. This includes sister state judgments340 as
well as foreign country judgments that Texas recognizes under the second
uniform act, the Uniform Foreign Country Money Judgment Recognition
Act (UFCMJRA).341 The legislature recodified both acts in 1985 and incor-
porated them into the new Civil Practice and Remedies Code342 with no
significant changes.343
The most significant case for the Survey period is Detamore v. Sullivan.3"
Detamore involved a mandamus action brought by the relator-debtor
Detamore to require the trial court to vacate an order for the turnover of
stock and to nullify the recognition of a foreign country money judgment.
The creditor, Continental Bank of Canada, obtained a default judgment in
Canada against Detamore. Continental filed the default judgment in Harris
County and sought a writ of execution after abstracting the judgment.
Thereafter, Continental applied for a turnover order and the trial judge
signed an order for the turnover of Detamore's stock to the constable for sale
under the writ of execution.
Detamore sought the mandamus on two grounds. First, he contended
that the UFCMJRA required a plenary suit and a plenary hearing. Second,
Detamore contended that the UFCMJRA was unconstitutional. The court
held that the Act did not require a suit or hearing as a condition precedent
to the recognition of a foreign country money judgment.345 This court based
its reasoning on the plain import of the statute, which requires no hearing or
suit.346 The court did, however, hold that the Act was unconstitutional. 347
In so holding, the court stated that the Act, by its own measure, recognizes
that there are grounds for determining that a foreign country money judg-
ment is not entitled to recognition; the court noted, however, that the Act
does not create a procedure whereby a judgment debtor can assert grounds
for nonrecognition. 348
340. Full faith and credit also applies to judgments from federal courts, the District of
Columbia, and United States territories.
341. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-.008 (Vernon 1986) (formerly
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-6).
342. Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 1, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3274-77.
343. The only substantive change in the text of the UEFJA is the deletion of former § 7,
entitled "Uniformity of Interpretation," stating: "This Act shall be interpreted and construed
to achieve its general purpose to make the law of those states which enact it uniform." Act of
May 25, 1981, ch. 195, § 7, 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 464, 465, repealed by Act of June 16, 1985,
ch. 959, § 9, 1985, Tex. Gen. Laws 3242, 3322. Nonsubstantive changes included minor rear-
rangement of the text.
As with the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA's only substantive change is the deletion of former § 9
entitled "uniformity of Interpretation" worded much the same as its UEFJA counterpart. The
UFCMJRA text is also rearranged in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The uniform
judgment acts' move to the Civil Practice and Remedies Code was for recodification only, with
no intended substantive changes. See Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 10, 1985 Tex. Gen.
Laws (quoted in the "Enactment" preface to the Civil Practice and Remedies Code).
344. 731 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
345. Id. at 123.
346. Id.




As reported in the 1985 Survey, the court in Hennessy v. Marshall349 held
that a plenary hearing was necessary for the enforcement of foreign country
judgments. Detamore goes one step further in stating that the absence of a
procedure for hearing is per se unconstitutional. 350 The 1985 Survey's ques-
tion on Hennessey also applies to Detamore: Does the absence of a plenary
hearing for enforcement of a sister state judgment render the UEFJA uncon-
stitutional? One might respond that the full faith and credit requirement
outweighs the hearing requirement since to mandate a hearing undermines
the concept of full faith and credit. The full faith and credit doctrine does
not, however, override due process. 351 The literal language of the Act does
not mandate a hearing, but merely authorizes a hearing if the judgment
debtor requests a stay.352
In Grynberg v. Christiansen353 Grynberg obtained a Colorado default
judgment against Eric Christiansen, a resident of Belgium. Grynberg then
sought to enforce the judgment by filing a notice to take the deposition of a
nonparty witness, Jorgen Christiansen, the son of the defendant. Jorgen filed
a motion to modify the subpoena duces tecum, alleging that Grynberg had
never served Eric Christiansen with a summons in the Colorado action. The
trial court agreed and held the Colorado judgment void. 3 54 The court of
appeals reversed, holding that Jorgen did not qualify as a party in interest
who could collaterally attack the judgment. 355 The court found that Jor-
gen's only asserted interest was to avoid the inconvenience of attending an
oral deposition and producing documents. 356
Farley v. Farley357 is instructive on the requirements for the admissibility
of a foreign judgment. Constance Farley brought suit in Texas seeking to
modify a California judgment which ordered James Farley to pay $175.00
per month in child support. The trial court rendered a default judgment
ordering James Farley to pay $1,150.00 per month.358 James Farley ap-
pealed by writ of error contending, in part, that the copy of the California
judgment introduced at the trial was hearsay and did not conform to the
requirements of either federal law359 or the Texas UEFJA. 36° The court of
appeals held that the California judgment failed to satisfy the requirements
of the federal statute in that it did not contain a certificate from the judge
that the attestation of the court clerk was in proper form. 36 1 The court,
349. 682 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
350. 731 S.W.2d at 124.
351. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 2, § 104.
352. See generally TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (Vernon 1986) (section
(c) indicates a foreign judgment, when filed, is subject to the same procedures, etc. as a judg-
ment of the court in which it is filed).
353. 727 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
354. Id. at 666.
355. Id. at 667.
356. Id.
357. 731 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
358. Id. at 734.
359. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
360. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.008 (Vernon 1986).
361. 731 S.W.2d at 735.
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however, went on to hold that failure to satisfy the requirements of the fed-
eral law does not automatically render the judgment inadmissible. 362 Con-
formity with the Texas Rules of Evidence suffices. 363 In the instant case, the
court noted that the California judgment was properly authenticated. 36
The court noted that once properly authenticated, it was properly admitted
as some evidence and sufficient evidence that a valid subsisting final judg-
ment existed. 365 Even though the underlying obligation might violate the
public policy of the state, Texas must still give full faith and credit to a valid
foreign state judgment.366
In GNL V Corporation v. Jackson 367 GNLV filed an authenticated judg-
ment with the Johnson County clerk. The judgment covered a Nevada gam-
bling debt. The trial court enjoined enforcement of the judgment on grounds
that it violated Texas public policy. The court of appeals held that Texas
could not deny full faith and credit to the Nevada judgment merely because
it offended Texas public policy. 368
2. Common Law Enforcement
In Reeves v. FS.L.I.C.369 the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
order directing Reeves to turn over any evidence of ownership of property he
held in Portugal to a court appointed receiver. The Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation sued Reeves in Texas to enforce a Maryland
judgment against Reeves. Reeves contended that the court's order consti-
tuted an in rem action and that the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
title to the Portuguese property. The court determined that the trial court's
order did not adjudicate title.370 The trial court merely directed Reeves to
surrender any indicia of title he possessed rather than ordering him to make
a conveyance. 37'
3. Child Custody Enforcement
Texas statutorily enforces sister state child custody awards under the Uni-
form Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).372 In addition, federal law
mandates full faith and credit for sister state custody orders under the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA),373 a corollary to the
statutory full faith and credit imperative for general state court judg-






367. 736 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, writ denied).
368. Id. at 894.
369. 732 S.W.2d 380, 382 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.63-.64(a) (Vernon 1986).
373. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655, 663 (1982).
374. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
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forcement standards for interstate child custody disputes.
The Survey period produced one significant case in the area. In Garza v.
Harney,3 75 a mandamus action, Garza and Taylor were husband and wife
residing in Mexico at the time that the divorce action was filed. The Mexi-
can court granted the divorce and ordered the parties to abide by various
mutual agreements concerning their property and their two children. Taylor
received temporary custody of the children, with the stipulation that he
could not remove the children from the Monterrey area. The court gave
Garza liberal visitation rights. Final custodial orders would be entered after
psychological testing was conducted.
In June 1985, before the Monterrey court granted final custody, Taylor
removed the children to Randall County, Texas. Garza filed a petition in
Randall County seeking enforcement of the Mexican court's orders and to
force Taylor to return the children to Mexico. Taylor counterclaimed, seek-
ing both a temporary injunction and a change of the Mexican orders.
Judge Harney granted the temporary injunction pending final orders, and
allowed the children to remain with Taylor in the United States, limiting
Garza's access to the children. Garza alleged the district court in Randall
County lacked both the jurisdiction and the power to enter a temporary or-
der or to modify the Mexican decree. Garza sought relief under the
UCCJA. 376 This statute mandates that a decree of a similar court in another
nation where basic due process was observed, should be recognized and en-
forced by Texas courts. 377
Garza contended that the UCCJA prohibited the district court's action.
The jurisdictional section of the UCCJA permits a Texas court with general
jurisdiction over custody matters to make a custody determination by initial
decree or modification decree if one of four possible jurisdictional bases ex-
ists. 378 Those four bases are commonly referred to as the (1) home state,
(2) significant connection, (3) emergency and, (4) default bases. 379 Even if a
jurisdictional base exists, however, the Texas court may not be able to deter-
mine or modify custody. For instance, the Act prohibits a Texas court from
asserting jurisdiction absent specific circumstances, if a proceeding concern-
ing the custody of the child was pending in a court of another state at the
time the petition was filed.380 Additionally, a Texas court may not modify
the decree of a court of a sister state unless two criteria are met.381
The trial court's temporary order only mentioned the emergency jurisdic-
375. 726 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ).
376. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-.75 (Vernon 1986).
377. Id. § 11.73.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. § 1156. The Act would allow a Texas court to exercise jurisdiction if the foreign
court had stayed the proceeding because Texas presented a more appropriate forum or for
other (unnamed) reasons. Id.
381. Id. § 11.64(a). "(1) it appears to the court of this State that the court that rendered
the decree (lacks] jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this subchapter




tional ground. That ground is satisfied if the child is physically present in
Texas, and has either been abandoned, or "it is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mis:
treatment of abuse or is otherwise neglected or there is a serious and imme-
diate question concerning the welfare of the child. .... -382
The court concluded that Taylor had established both elements of the
emergency base and that the evidence supported the district court's finding
concerning the daughter. 3 83 The court, however, did not reach the same
conclusion about the son. It found no evidence of any emergency concern-
ing him and no indication or contention that he needed emergency protec-
tion. 384 The Family Code provides that a Texas court may have jurisdiction
of a custody dispute and still not have the power to act if a court of a sister
state or nation has jurisdiction of the matter. 385 The court of appeals con-
cluded that the district court was empowered to act, but only on a short-
term, temporary, or emergency basis.386 The court relied upon Hache v.
Riley,387 in which a New Jersey court pointed out that a court could exercise
emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJA whenever there was a potential for
immediate harm. The court ruled that the emergency involving the daugh-
ter permitted the district court to enter a temporary order for the daughter's
protection until the original forum state took proper steps to adequately pro-
tect the daughter. 38 8 The court of appeals concluded that the district court




The Survey period produced no significant preclusion cases arising from
foreign judgments. Readers should note A.L. T. Corporation v. Small Busi-
ness Administration 390 for the preclusive effect of a Texas state court judg-
ment in Texas federal court and Exxon Corporation v. Chick Kam Cho03 9 1
for the preclusive effect of a Texas federal judgment in a Texas state court.
382. Garza v. Harney, 726 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1987, no writ) (quoting
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.53(a)(3)(B) (Vernon 1986)).
383. Id. at 202.
384. Id.
385. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.56, 11.64 and 11.73 (Vernon 1986); see McElreath v.
Stewart, 545 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex. 1977); Milner v. Kilgore, 718 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
386. 726 S.W.2d at 203.
387. 186 N.J. Super. 119, 451 A.2d 971, 975 (Super. Ct., Ch. Div. 1982).
388. 726 S.W.2d at 203.
389. Id.
390. 801 F.2d 1451 (5th Cir. 1986).
391. 817 F.2d 307, 324-25 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 343, 98 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1987).
See discussion in Inconvenient Forum section, supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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